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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
An important research area in economics is the study of interaction between juris-
dictions’ economic policies, and how these interactions aﬀect individuals. Strategic interac-
tions between fiscal and monetary policies, and their eﬀects on governments and individuals
are investigated in this dissertation. Governments use fiscal and monetary policies to en-
hance the welfare of individuals living within their jurisdictions’ boundaries. In order to
be able to supply public goods that are demanded by individuals, governments need to
raise revenue. Main findings are that monetary competition leads to lower inflation rates;
low tax rates as well as local amenities are important factors in attracting migrants into a
jurisdiction; monetary unification leads to oversupply of public goods; and monetary policy
of a monetary union is aﬀected by accession countries’ inflation rates.
In the second chapter, interactions between the capital tax rate and the inflation
rate are investigated. A model is presented that allows for international trade in goods
markets as well as in money markets. It is shown that interactions of capital tax rate and
inflation rate create horizontal and vertical externalities. Optimal levels of the capital tax
rate and the inflation rate depend on how these externalities dominate one another. If a
currency union is formed, the inflation rate that prevails across the currency union will be
higher than the inflation rate in either country under monetary independence, and national
public good provision will be suboptimally high. Inflation elasticities of the demand for a
country’s national currency determine whether capital taxes will be higher or lower under
single currency in that country.
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The third chapter provides empirical evidence about the eﬀect of local fiscal vari-
ables on individuals’ choice of location. Empirical results obtained from the 2000 Census
elderly migration data using a general gravity model of migration flows confirm earlier find-
ings of the ‘same sign problem’ in the literature, which means that the elderly both migrate
from and to states where taxes are higher. The same sign problem can be attributed to
the heterogeneity of in- and out-migrating groups. It is proposed here that it is possible
to control for heterogeneity of migrating groups by controlling for some characteristics of
either the origin or the destination state. In a gravity equation estimation for elderly mi-
gration, when controlled for heterogeneity of migrants, the same sign problem fades away,
and the gravity equation shows clearer patterns for elderly migration. In particular, local
amenities, tax exemptions, and low inheritance taxes are shown to be significant variables
in attracting the elderly into a state.
The fourth chapter addresses a crucial question: What is an optimal monetary
policy for a candidate country and the monetary union to follow prior to accession? In a
hypothetical setting, where there are no pre-accession monetary rules for accession coun-
tries, eﬀect of bilateral exchange rates between the currency union’s currency and accession
countries’ currencies on the currency union’s inflation target is being investigated here. A
nominal exchange rate based criterion both for welfare of the accession country and for
currency union’s monetary policy target is presented. An accession country with an ap-
preciating currency will find it non-optimal to join the currency union, and in case of an
accession, currency union’s monetary authority will need to adjust its optimal target crite-
rion for inflation to a higher level. Accession of a country with a depreciating currency will
lower the optimal target for the currency union.
Finally, the fifth chapter provides fundamental conclusions.
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CHAPTER II
INFLATION TAX COMPETITION AND ITS EFFECTS ON NATIONAL CAPITAL
TAXES
Introduction
Although interregional tax competition has been a widely investigated area of
research in public economics since Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986),
research focusing on how diﬀerent monetary regimes aﬀect interregional tax competition,
and how monetary policy itself is aﬀected by the tax competition caught surprisingly little
attention.
Governments have two broad sources of revenue: Taxation and seignorage. Seignor-
age is obtained by simply printing money, which can be an inflationary practice under many
circumstances. As a result, seignorage imposes a tax on agents’ nominal money balances
to the degree that it creates inflation, because inflation erodes the purchasing power of
nominal money balances. The idea that inflation is not only a monetary problem, but also
an element of government finance, is not a new one. According to the public finance view
of inflation, pioneered by Phelps (1973), inflation should actually be derived as part of the
public finance problem along with other optimal tax rates. The central question of this
paper is: Given that inflation is an integral part of government finance, and that govern-
ments can use inflation rate as well as capital tax rate as strategical variables in financing
a national public good, how will monetary unification aﬀect inflation rate and capital tax
rate?
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The fundamental argument of this paper is that governments compete in inflation
in a similar fashion as they would compete in other conventional taxes, if agents in each
country can keep at least some fraction of their savings in a foreign currency and then use
their foreign currency holdings to purchase foreign products. Intuition is easy: Competition
in inflation will lead to low inflation levels, because a country with high inflation rate will
lose its inflation tax base, which is defined as balances held in that country’s currency. Each
country will end up with low inflation levels in a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
Inflation is an important concern in currency unions. As an example, the mon-
etary authority of the Eurozone, European Central Bank (ECB) adopts very strong anti-
inflationary policies and is almost desparate to keep its inflation level below 2% annualy.
However, taking a closer look at inflation performance of the Eurozone, one observes that
the Eurozone is not doing particularly well compared to similar economies. This paper
provides an explanation for the case that a currency union can actually create a higher
inflation rate for its members: Due to creation of a currency union, incentives for inflation
tax competition will obviously be absent, and a higher inflation rate will prevail across the
union. Moreover, this will aﬀect other taxe rates, such as the capital tax rate, as well.
In a model that allows for international trade in goods markets as well as in
money markets, interactions of the capital tax rate and the inflation rate are investigated.
It is shown that the capital tax rate set by a national government creates a horizontal ex-
ternality for the other country’s national government, and this eﬀect pushes the equilibrium
level of capital tax rates in both countries down. A similar eﬀect is present for the inflation
rate of the domestic currency chosen by the national central bank. We will call this phe-
nomenon ‘inflation tax competition’. Inflation tax competition pushes equilibrium level of
inflation rates in both countries down. However, there is a vertical externality created by
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the interaction between capital taxe rates and inflation rates, which leads to higher capital
tax rates in both countries. Equilibrium levels of capital tax and inflation rates depend on
which of these opposing eﬀects will dominate. If the two countries form a currency union,
then the inflation rate that prevails across the currency union, as determined optimally
by the choice of single currency’s growth rate by the central bank will be higher than the
inflation rate that would prevail in either country under monetary independence. Although
inflation rate will be higher, individual countries will choose a lower capital tax rate than
under monetary independence.
Capital taxes also play an important role in international policy decisions. Espe-
cially, since the capital account liberalization movements of 1970s and 1980s, free trade in
foreign currencies has been made possible through free trade in capital assets. As a result,
inflation tax competition as it will be discussed in this paper cannot be thought of as being
immune to capital market considerations. In this paper, we have a simple capital market
that pays an international real interest rate to those who invest in capital. It will be shown
that the vertical externality created by capital taxe rates and inflation rates is actually a
direct eﬀect of international real interest rate on households’ disposable incomes.
With increasing international integration and financial liberalization, foreign cur-
rencies, especially those which yield a more stable return than the domestic currency, occupy
some non-trivial fractions of individuals’ portfolios. In such a financially integrated envi-
ronment, governments will find it profitable to provide a strong currency, that is, a currency
subject to a lower inflation, and expand the tax base for inflation tax. This is the way two
or more governments with independent currencies engage in ‘inflation tax competition’.
There is one important remark we need to make here. Data shows that inflation
tax makes up a relatively small proportion of government revenues, especially in most of the
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developed countries. For example, from 1987 to 1996, inflation tax accounted only for 0.44%
of all tax revenues in UK, and 1.74% of all tax revenues in Germany. Although inflation
tax revenues don’t account for too great shares of government revenues, especially in most
of the developed countries, the benefits of a strong and stable currency is not limited
to increasing the inflation tax revenue only. The actual competition between diﬀerent
currencies is to determine which one will become a reserve currency, which implies control
over the international capital markets in the long run, because international capital markets
are mainly under control of the supplier of the reserve currency. Our model is too simple to
capture all these scenarios, and it is our ongoing project to explain the creation of a reserve
currency in a coalition formation setting. We just need to underline at this point that we
are aware of the empirical facts about the inflation tax revenues. Hence the inflation tax
competition, as it is defined in this paper, can be understood as an analogy to competition
among currencies for gaining the trust of international markets.
The main argument of this paper is that when a monetary union is formed between
countries who have been competing in inflation rates, the union-wide inflation rate will be
higher than what individual countries would have obtained. This is a direct result of cease
of inflation tax competition across members of a monetary union. Capital taxes will have
to adjust accordingly.
Background
Capital tax competition literature first focused on horizontal externalities across
jurisdictions discussed by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986). If the tax base is mobile, then
diﬀerent regions compete against each other to capture most of the mobile tax base. In
equilibrium, overall tax rate will be low. Moreover, since public good provision is based on
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government revenues, public goods will be undersupplied. This result simply follows from
the fact that competing jurisdictions of the same rank will engage in horizontal competition,
and an increase in one jurisdiction’s tax rate will increase the tax base that is available to
other jurisdictions.
Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) show that tax competition doesn’t have to lead
to ineﬃciently low taxes, and it can lead to high taxes instead, if the competing agents
are diﬀerent layers of the state. That is, the same tax base can be double taxed by two
diﬀerent layers of government (say, by the local government, as well as by the federal
government), and in that can equilibrium tax rates will be too high. When vertically
connected jurisdictions, such as state and federal governments, compete for a mobile tax
base, then each of them will be subject to vertical externalities. That is, an increase in one
jurisdiction’s tax rate will result in a decrease rather than an increase in the tax base that
is available to the other jurisdiction. In most cases horizontal and vertical externalities are
found together, and whether the equilibrium tax rates will be too low or too high depends
on whether horizontal or vertical externalities dominate. 1
Another source of vertical externalities is decentralization, as analyzed by Wilson
and Janeba (2005). In their model, the mix of horizontal and vertical externalities is
determined by the degree of decentralization, and they find that ‘in contrast to standard
tax competition models, decentralizing the provision of public goods may improve welfare’
(p.1211).
Makris (2006) investigates what happens to capital tax rates if countries share
a common currency. This paper is close to ours, however we diﬀer in our fundamental
assumptions. Makris (2006) assumes that there is only a single composite commodity and
1Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2007), Lockwood and Makris (2006) provide empirical evidence
that support the theory of vertical tax competition, and how it compares to the eﬀects of the horizontal tax
competition.
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there is autarky in money markets. Hence, his model cannot distinguish between the two
cases of many countries with many currencies and many countries with a single currency.
Our results, as far as eﬀects of single currency on capital tax rates are considered, are in
line with Makris (2006), however we allow for trade in money markets, and as a result, we
are able to focus on inflation as a strategic variable.
Several papers investigate the strategic interaction of jurisdictional fiscal authori-
ties and monetary authority in a monetary union. They reach diﬀerent results depending
on specific assumptions they make. Cooper and Kempf (2003) consider a two world country
in an overlapping generations model, where agents need to accumulate foreign currency in
the first period if they want to consume foreign goods in the second period. Such a cash
constraint imposed by both countries creates an opportunity for both governments to ex-
port their inflation to the other country. When these countries are in a monetary union, no
such cash constraints will be available, hence there will optimally be no inflation. Bottazzi
and Manasse (2002) show that, when the monetary authority of the monetary union can-
not commit to a lump-sum redistribution of seignorage, then excessive inflation will result.
Their model, however, doesn’t incorporate any trade relations.
It is not trivial to bring in money into the canonical tax competition model of
Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986). Makris (2006) does so by employing a utility function
where money is an argument and provides positive marginal utility. Introducing money in
the utility function can be justified by the underlying assumption that there exist frictions
in the money market. Actually, Feenstra (1986) shows that there exists a functional equiva-
lence between having money as an argument in the utility function and introducing liquidity
costs in households’ budget constraints. Such frictions, however, don’t play a crucial role
for our model, which focuses on transactions role of money. The very reason why households
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hold money constitutes an important factor for understanding how exactly the competition
in inflation tax works. As a result, we need to clarify not only what the money demand is,
but also why households hold money. As Ostroy and Starr (1990) discuss it in great detail,
the transactions role of money cannot be separated from its role as the store of value. For
purposes of this study, the demand for money should emerge as a direct result of these two
functions of money.
Sibert and Liu (1998) present a model where central banks of home and foreign
countries act like providers of diﬀerentiated goods in a Bertrand model. They show that
when two currencies can be substituted for one another, money growth can either be too
high or too low depending on how substitutable they are. In our model, we assume perfect
substitutability between currencies, however we also assume that households are perfectly
informed about central bank policies, so that we don’t obtain a race to the bottom in
inflation tax competition.
There is a significant portion of literature on currency unions, claiming that estab-
lishment of currency union will lower the optimal inflation rate for its members. Cooper and
Kempf (2003), Sibert (1992), Cardarelli and Vidal (1999) are examples of this view. These
papers either ignore the vertical externalities created by interactions of inflation and other
taxes, or in their models, there are too strong assumptions which ensure that a country will
have enough incentive to export its inflation tax. That is, in a cash in advance model, where
public good is financed by goverment revenues, inflation tax is a good source of income,
because altough it taxes foreigners who are holding domestic currency, its benefits (that is,
public good provision) are not shared with foreigners. In our paper, we stress the fact that
foreigners may abandon the domestic currency, if it is too costly to hold. To the best of
our knowledge, this paper is the first investigation of horizontal and vertical tax external-
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ities that are borne by interactions of capital taxes and inflation rates under a regime of
independent but tradable currencies and under a regime of a single currency.
Model
There are two countries, country 1 and country 2, and each country is populated by
a representative household. Each country has a national government that decides at which
rate to tax domestically employed capital. Trade of goods and money takes places at the
central exchange of each country. Central exchange of either country issues a national fiat
currency. National currency of country 1 will be called currency 1, and national currency
of country 2 will be called currency 2. Revenue from inflation tax is transferred to the
corresponding national government, and revenue from capital taxation as well as inflation
tax revenue are used in financing a national public good. Both countries impose a local
currency constraint. That is, country specific private consumption goods can be bought
only using domestic currency.
Households
Each household is endowed with a mobile factor, capital, and an immobile factor,
labor. Amount of capital endowed to a household in either country is Ω Endowment of
labor for either household is 1 unit, and it is supplied inelastically.
This is a two period model. In the first period, households receive labor and
capital income, and decide what proportion of their income they want to keep in currency
1, and what proportion in currency 2. In second period, households use their currency 1
and currency 2 holdings to purchase private consumption goods of country 1 and country
2, respectively.
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The firm located in country  will be called firm  and private consumption good
produced in country  will be called good  Demand for good  by the household in country 
is denoted by   Preferences of the household in country  is given by  ¡ ¢+ () 
Household’s utility function has standard properties:  (0 0) = 0 1  0 2 
0 11  0 22  0 where 1 and 2 denote marginal utilities of home and foreign private
consumption, respectively. Moreover  (0) = 0 0  0 00  0
Budget constraint for first period is given as  ≡ +Ω = +   and
for second period  = 0   = 

0 
First period budget constraint shows that nominal holdings of money balances in
terms of currency  should be equal to household’s income expressed in terms of currency
  is price of good  in the first period, and 0 is price of good  in the second period. 
is real wage income earned by household   is the real return to capital when it is sold to
firm   is the nominal exchange rate for currency  in terms of currency , and finally,
 denotes nominal currency  holdings of houshold 
Production
Production in both countries is performed by perfectly competitive firms, and
it is subject to no uncertainty. Since one unit of labor is supplied inelastically by the
representative household in country  to the firm in country , capital employed by a firm
will equivalently be capital per labor, and we will denote it by  Capital is perfectly mobile
across the two countries, and as a result, whether household  decides to sent its capital
to firm 1 or firm 2, capital has to earn the same marginal income. Hence we formulate a
non-arbitrage condition as:  =  Law of one price holds, and there are no arbitrage
opportunities. As a result, an international real interest rate of  prevails in the international
11
capital market.
Production technology in country  = {1 2} is subject to constant returns to scale,
and it is given by a twice diﬀerentiable production function  ()  which satisfies  (0) = 0
 0  0 and  00  0
Firm  produces a total output of  ()  and it pays  as capital income,  as
labor income,  as tax on capital. Thus the first order condition for the profit maximization
problem of firm  yields that the marginal product of capital has to be equal marginal cost
of hiring capital, which is stated as  0 () = ( + )  As a result, optimum level of capital
employed by a firm through international capital market is a function of real interest rate
and domestic capital tax rate:  =  ( + ) 
Income to immobile factor, namely labor, is given by
 ≡  ( + ) =  ( ( + ))−  0 ( ( + ))  ( + )
meaning that labor income is a function of the marginal cost of capital.
Households receive labor and capital income at the end of the first period, and
their disposable income will be denoted by  ( )  Each household uses its disposable
income to purchase currency 1 and currency 2:
 ( ) ≡  ( + ) + Ω =  + 1
The basic question a household faces at the end of the first period is, what fraction
of disposable income do they want to hold in home currency, and what fraction in foreign
currency. Demand for currency 1 and currency 2 are derived demand from demand for
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either private consumptions. Given currency 1 and currency 2 stocks chosen by household
, it will be able to purchase  = 01 and  = 

02 units of good  and , respectively.
Monetary Policy
Each country has a central exchange that acts as the market place for domestically
produced private good, for currency exchange, and as the sole issuer of national currency.
Real revenue from money creation is transferred from the central exchange of a country to
the government of that same country. Revenue from money creation is called seignorage2.
In this model, we will define money as the commodity with the highest ‘saleable-
ness’, following the definition of Menger (1894), and we will separate the periods of buying
and selling in goods markets so that money will have a strictly positive value in equilibrium,
which builds on the general equilibrium model introduced by Magill and Quinzii (1992).
At the end of the first period, individuals bring their disposable incomes, which is kept in
terms of country specific private consumption good, to the central exchanges of country
1 and country 2 in order to acquire currency 1 and currency 2, respectively. In either of
the two central exchanges, households exchange their disposable incomes for fiat currency
issued by the respective central exchange. Let  denote the amount of country  currency
demanded by the household in country  The household in country 1 decides what fraction
of its income to keep in country 1 currency, 11, and sells this fraction to the central bank
of country 1 in exchange for country 1 currency. It sells the rest of its disposable income
to the central bank of country 2 in exchange for country 2 currency, 12. Same applies
to the household in country 2. Both households use their currency holdings to buy private
consumption goods of country 1 and country 2 in the second period. Thus total monetary
2Since there is no economic growth in this model, there won’t be any diﬀerence between seignorage and
inflation tax.
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holdings of household in country  is given by ¡ + ¢  measured in currency Total
stock (across the two countries) of currency  is given by  =  +
In the second period, both households buy country 1 and country 2 private con-
sumption goods from the central exchanges of country 1 and country 2, respectively. Central
exchange in either country decide at what rate they want to increase the monetary base,
which is simply the money they created during the first period by buying households’ dis-
posable incomes. Central exchange of country  decides to expand the monetary base by
a ratio of  Hence the seignorage revenue of the central bank in country  is given by
 ¡ +¢  Central exchange of country  uses the newly printed currencies to pur-
chase some the domestic private consumption good, and transfers it to the local government,
as the inflation tax revenue.
Since we will mention some basic characteristics of an equilibrium, we need to
define an equilibrium first.
Equilibrium is defined for a given set of prices (1 2) as a vector of (  
      ) where shares of domestic currency holdings in total currency holdings
of households ()  inflation rates ()  capital tax rates ()  and exchange rate between
currencies () clear all markets (2 goods markets, 2 money markets, and an exchange rate
market), and no household, no national government, and no central bank can be better oﬀ
by deviating.
Both central exchanges determine the growth rate of their national currencies.
However, by doing so, in equilibrium, they are determining the domestic inflation rate.
Lemma 1 In both countries, choosing the growth rate of national currencies, denoted by
 for  = {1 2} is equivalent to choosing the domestic inflation rate,  in equilibrium.
Proof. Ratio of currency  in the second period to currency  in the first period
is given by
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¡ +¢+  ¡ +¢
( +) = (1 + )
At the end of first period, we have  ( ()− ) =  +  and at the
beginning of the second period, we have 0 ( ()− ) = (1 + )
¡ +¢ 
Hence,
(1 + ) ¡ +¢
0 =
 +

Using the definition of inflation rate  = 0−  we conclude that  = 
It is crucial to realize that growth of money will necessarily become inflation,
because there is no economic growth in this model. Although monetary policy tool is the
growth rate of money, no real growth implies that money growth will turn into inflation,
hence central bank sets the domestic inflation rate when it chooses the growth rate domestic
money supply.
In both countries, the second period money creation by the central exchange is
nothing but a tax on households’ wealth, because money creation in second period erodes
households’ currencies’ purchasing power.
When central exchanges transfer the real revenue from second period money cre-
ation to their national governments, national governments use the inflation tax revenue
together with capital tax revenue in financing a national public good. National public good
supply in country  is given by:  =  +  ¡ +¢  where  denotes the inflation
rate in country , and it is defined by  = 0−  where 0 denoted price level in country 
in the second period. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we can assume that the
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central exchange in country  decides to issue one unit of its national currency in order to
buy households’ disposible income.
As it has widely been studied in international economics literature, once individ-
uals’ monetary holdings are determined, central banks have every incentive to use inflation
tax excessively. As Hamada (1976) has shown, monetary expansion can take on the nature
of public bad, and lead to high inflation rates in both countries. At this point it is useful for
purposes of this paper to assume that central exchanges can credibly commit to a money
growth rate. That is, both households are well informed about what the growth rate of
money (hence inflation) is going to be in the second period, and they adjust their currency
holdings accordingly. Once households sold their disposable income, central exchanges do
not alter their pre-announced money growth rates.
At the beginning of the second period, the central exchange of country  issues
a total stock of new currencies that has  ¡ +¢ in nominal value Since  = 
real currency holdings of households in both countries will depreciate by (1 + )  The
real revenue from second period money creation,  ¡ +¢ is then transferred to the
national government.
National Welfare
National policies consist of capital tax rate and money growth rate. As explained
above, we will simply refer to inflation rate instead of the money growth rate in what follows.
Government chooses the capital tax rate which must be paid by the national firm to the
national government, at a constant rate per capital it employs. Central exchange chooses the
inflation rate, and transfers the inflation tax revenue to the national government. National
government supplies the nation with a public good that is produced by a linear technology
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using capital tax and inflation tax revenues. In both countries, the government as well as
the central exchange are benevolent, that is, their objective is to maximize their citizens’
welfare.
Capital market equilibrium is given by
2P
=1
 ( + ) = 2Ω Total capital endowment
of home and foreign countries is given by 2Ω and total demand for capital by firms has to be
equal to total capital endowment so that the international capital market is in equilibrium.
Capital market equilibrium makes it easy to see that real interest rate is necessarily a
function of home and foreign capital tax rates,  =  (1 2)  Moreover, in a symmetric
equilibrium we have  = 1 = 2 and as a result, we have  =  ()  with  = 0 = −12 .
Considering the equilibrium in currency  market, total supply of currency  in first
period is determined by what fraction of their disposable both households want to keep in
currency . Let  denote the fraction of country  household’s disposable income exchanged
for currency  at the central exchange of country , and fraction of country  household’s
disposable income exchanged for currency  is denoted by ¡1− ¢  so that we have
 ( ( )  ) +
¡
1− 
¢  ( ( )  ) =  +
At the end of money creation process in the first period, the two central exchanges
swap their holdings foreign currency which has been delivered by household in exchange of
some fraction of their currency holdings.
Lemma 2 In equilibrium, there will be a unique exchange rate. Indeterminacy of exchange
rate will only be the case, when currency  is held only in country , for  ∈ {1 2}
Proof. At the end of first period, central exchange of country  owns private
consumption good of country , sold to it by the household from country . The private
consumption good produced by country  and owned by the central exchange of country 
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is equivalent to
¡
1− 
¢  ( ( )  ) in real value. When the two central exchanges swap
those foreign private consumption good holdings, they establish an equilibrium exchange
rate as:
 = (1− )  ( ( )  )¡
1− 
¢  ( ( )  )
which has a strictly positive and unique value for  ( ( )  1) 0  ( ( )  2)
 0 1 ∈ (0 1)  and 2 ∈ (0 1)  It is important to note that however that if (1 2) = (1 1),
then exchange is undeterminate.
Although money growth rates, and thus inflation rates don’t play a role in the
above statement, we need to alter money demand to include the perfect information of sec-
ond period’s inflation rate. This doesn’t change the fundamental lesson of the above lemma,
however money demand becomes equivalent to demand for country specific consumption
goods. Since we will deal with symmetric equilibria, the following lemma will be useful:
Lemma 3 In a symmetric equilibrium, when both central exchanges set the nominal price
of their national output at 1 unit of local currency, then we have  = 1
In a symmetric equilibrium, the household in country  will hold some fraction 
of its disposable income in currency , and some fraction, namely (1− ) in currency , so
that we have:
 =  ( ( )  )
1 +   
 = (1− )  ( ( )  )
1 + 
Since the household in country  will use its currency  and currency  balances,
denoted by  and   to purchase country  and country  private consumption goods
 and   respectively, and since there is perfect foresight (or central bank’s perfect
commitment to announced money growth rate) this necessarily leads to:
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
0 = 
 =  ( ( )  )
1 +  

0 = 
 = (1− )  ( ( )  )
1 + 
The optimization problem of household  is:
 = argmax 
µ ( ( )  )
1 +  
(1− )  ( ( )  )
1 + 
¶
First order condition of household’s optimal choice of  yields in a symmetric
equilibrium:
1 ¡ ¢ = 1 + 
1 +  2
¡ ¢
By the envelope theorem,
 =  ( )  and   0

  0
This leads to the following total demand function for currency , denoted by :
 + =  ( ( )  ) +
¡
1− 
¢  ( ( )  ) =  (1 2 1 2)
The following lemma will be useful in analyzing the eﬀects of marginal changes
in capital tax rates and inflation rates in either or both countries. The lemma’s proof is
provided in the appendix.
Lemma 4 Demand for currency  is given by  =  (    )  for which we have:

  0

  0

  0

  0
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Proof. Recall that  =  (    ) =  ( ( )   ( ( )  ))  and
observe that   0 
  0   0 

  0   0   0   0   0
Using the envelope theorem, we obtain:  =


  0 

 =


  0 

 =


  +


  0 

 =


 1  0
Simplifying, national welfare of country  depends on capital taxes and inflation
rates of both countries:
 (    ) = 
∙ ( )  ( ( )  )
1 +  
(1−  ( ))  ( ( )  )
1 + 
¸
+  []
(II.1)
where public good in country  is given by:
 =  ( ( ) + ) +
+ ¡ ( ( )   ( ( )  )) + ¡¡1−  ( )¢   ( ( )  )¢¢
In the above equation, it is clearly shown that the public good is financed by two
sources: capital tax revenue and inflation tax revenue. National government of country 
has a capital tax revenue of  ( ( ) + )  and the central bank of country 1 transfers
its inflation tax revenue to the national government, which is given by:
 ¡ ( ( )   ( ( )  )) + ¡¡1−  ( )¢   ( ( )  )¢¢
Seignorage and Capital Taxation
How inflation and capital taxes interact under diﬀerent monetary regimes will be
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discussed in this section.
There are two monetary regimes: Either a country has its own national currency,
or it forms a currency union with the other country. Independent national currency is
governed by the national central bank. Real revenue from money creation is transferred to
national government where it is used for financing a national public good. This regime will
be called ‘monetary independence’. When country 1 and country 2 form a currency union,
there will be a single central bank of the currency union. Central bank of the currency
union is also benevolent, and real revenue from money creation will be equally distributed
between the two national governments. This regime will be called ‘currency union’.
Competition in inflation tax exists only under the regime of monetary indepen-
dence, and it is lost with the creation of a currency union. Although vertical externalities
between the capital tax rate and the inflation tax rate, or equivalently, the inflation rate,
don’t change their nature from one regime to the other, the horizontal externalities are af-
fected directly by the creation of a currency union. It is due to the horizontal externalities
between the two countries that keeps the inflation rates in both countries down. However,
with creation of a currency union, there will be no competition in inflation, hence the central
bank of the currency union will be able to internalize the horizontal externalities, and create
a higher level of inflation. Hence, lack of competition in inflation tax is not necessarily an
adverse aﬀect. This result is pretty intuitive, because otherwise, the two countries wouldn’t
create a currency union.
Although central banks are benevolent and they transfer their real revenues to
national governments, this doesn’t necessarily mean that central banks are under control of
national governments. We will assume in this section that central banks, whether national
or currency union wide, are independent in the sense that money growth rate and capital
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tax rate are chosen non-cooperatively by diﬀerent authorities. Policy vector that consists
of money growth rate (or equivalently, inflation rate) and capital tax rate, is the Nash
equilibrium of non-cooperative game between central bank and government.
Seignorage and Capital Tax Revenue under National Currencies
Welfare of household in country  under monetary independence is given by (II.1).
National government as well as the central exchange of country  are benevolent, hence they
aim to maximize the welfare of the representative household living in country . For this
purpose, central exchange in country  solves  = 0 for given policy variables of countries
1 and 2 (1 2 2)  and the government solves  = 0 for given policy variables of countries
1 and 2 (1 2 2) 
Aim of this paper is to compare small changes in domestic inflation rate and
capital tax rate to their non-cooperative equilibrium levels, for this purpose, we will focus
on marginal changes in the welfare function of country  with respect to inflation rate and
capital tax rate. In this section we will investigate how a small change in inflation rate
and capital tax rate aﬀect the national welfare, and in the next section where we focus
on the case of a currency union, we will take our findings under monetary independence
as a benchmark, and compare our findings under currency union to those under monetary
independence.
The central exchange of country  takes foreign policy variables which are inflation
rate and capital tax rate of country , (  ), as well as the capital tax rate set by the
national government of country ,  as given, and maximizes national welfare of country 
by solving the following first order condition:
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
 =
µ 
1 + 

 −

(1 + )2
¶
1 −
µ 
1 + 


¶
2 + (II.2)
+0
µ
 + 
µ
  −

 
¶¶
Solving for  = 0 yields the Nash inflation tax level for country  and rearrang-
ing, we obtain
 = 1
(1 + )
³
1
 +  − 

´ (II.3)
where  is the marginal rate of substitution of public for private good in
country .  and  are country  inflation elasticities of demand for currency  and
demand for currency  respectively.
Horizontal externality of domestic inflation is evident in the above equation. As
the inflation rate associated with currency  increases, this will aﬀect not only currency
holdings of the representative household in country , but also currency holding decision of
the household in country  is aﬀected. As a result, inflation tax revenue of central exchange
in country  erodes faster than it would erode in case of autarky. This is the horizontal
externality associated with domestic inflation rates that leads to lower inflation rates in
both countries. Hence the very idea of the "inflation tax competition" is embodied in this
response as described above.
National government of country  takes foreign policy variables as well as the infla-
tion rate set by the central exchange of country  as given, and maximizes national welfare
by choosing a capital tax rate. The first order condition for the of national government’s
optimization problem country  yields:
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
 = 
µ ( ( )  )


 +
 ( ( )  )

¶
1 +
+(1− )
µ ( ( )  )


 +
 ( ( )  )

¶
2 + (II.4)
+
µµ ( ( )  )


 +
 ( ( )  )

¶
+
 ( ( )  )



¶ 
 
0
Solving for  = 0 yields the Nash capital tax level for country , and rearranging
we obtain
0
1 =
 =
1
(1 + ) ¡1 + 12 + ¢ (II.5)
where  is the capital tax elasticity of demand for capital in country 
Horizontal externality created by non-cooperative choice of the capital tax rate in
country  manifests itself in its eﬀect on international real interest rate,  We have shown
in previous section that in a symmetrical equilibrium for capital tax rates, an increase in
the capital tax rate of country  will decrease international real interest rate by ¡−12¢  As
a result, an increase in the capital tax rate of country  not only decreases representative
household’s disposable income in country , it also decreases the real value of the disposable
income of household in country . This is the very link that gives rise to a vertical externality
between capital tax rate and inflation rate, captured by the term
³ ´ in (II.4).
The optimal choice of the capital tax rate of country  can be separated in two:
Horizontal externality due to capital tax competition between the two countries, and the
vertical externality created by the existance of the inflation tax. Horizontal externality is
represented by the following term:
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
µ ( ( )  )


 +
 ( ( )  )

¶
1 +
+(1− )
µ ( ( )  )


 +
 ( ( )  )

¶
Vertical externality created by the existance of the inflation tax is represented by:
µµ ( ( )  )


 +
 ( ( )  )

¶
+
 ( ( )  )



¶ 
 
0
As the capital tax rate of country  increases , country  household’s demand for
currency decreases. This is a direct result of the decrease in household’s disposable income.
Seignorage and Capital Tax Revenue under a Single Currency
In this subsection, we will investigate how the case of a currency union diﬀers from
that of monetary independence. When country 1 and country 2 form a currency union, they
abandon their national currencies as well as their national central banks, and there will be
only one central bank that issues the common currency of the currency union.
There will be a single central exchange when a currency union is formed, and it
will serve in the same manner just like national central exchanges did under monetary inde-
pendence. The two households in both countries sell their disposable income to the central
exchange of the currency union in exchange for common currency, and in the second period
they purchase private consumption goods using the common currency. Central exchange
of the currency union chooses a money growth rate (necessarily same as the inflation rate)
for the common currency in order to maximize the joint welfare of both countries, and
it distributes real revenue from currency creation equally to the national governments of
25
country 1 and country 2.
National governments still retain their authority of choosing a capital tax rate for
the domestic use of capital. National governments’ objective is to maximize the welfare of
their citizen household. National governments’ objective function is given by
 = 
¡ (   )   (   )¢+  ∙ ( ( ) + ) + 1
2

¸
where  =  ( ( )  ) +  ( ( )  )
The first order condition of national government’s optimization problem in country
 is not very diﬀerent from the case of monetary independence, and it is given by:
 
 =
µ ( ( )  )


 +
 ( ( )  )

¶
(1 + 2) +
+
1
2
µ ( ( )  )


 +
 ( ( )  )

¶ 
 
0 + (II.6)
+
 ( ( )  )




 
0 (II.7)
where   denotes the welfare of country  under currency union, and  denoted
the aggregate demand for the common currency in both countries, and equilibrium tax rate
is found by solving 
 = 0 Rearranging, we obtain the marginal rate of substitution of
public for private good in country  as follows
 = 1(1 + ) ¡1 +  + ¢ (II.8)
The only diﬀerence between (II.4) and (II.6) is that in (II,6) vertical externality
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between domestic tax rate and inflation rate has greater eﬀect on country 2, because the
common inflation rate is aﬀected through the term
³ ´ 
Central bank of currency union maximizes the joint welfare of both countries, and
solves the following first order condition:
X
∈{12}
 
 = 2 (1 + 2)

 +
µ
 + 


¶
0 = 0 (II.9)
which yields
 = 1(1 + ) (II.10)
Comparing (II.2) to (II.9), one observes that non-cooperative inflation rate under
currency union has to be higher than that under monetary independence. Intuition is simple:
Central bank of the currency union doesn’t face an as severe threat of losing its tax base,
which is demand for its monetary base, as a national central bank faces, when it increases
the inflation rate associated with its currency. Hence this is inflation tax competition, and
this very simple model demonstrates how inflation tax competition can yield lower inflation
rates in line with the arguments of Hayek (1976) favoring monetary competition.
Theorem 1 Under currency union, public good provision will be sub-optimally high.
Eﬃcient provision of public good will be satisfied when  = 1. This is only
true when  = 0 which cannot be the case. Hence, we have   1 and the level of
public good provision under a currency union is sub-optimally high.
Moreover, under currency union we have: − = 
Theorem 2 Inflation rate associated with the common currency of the currency union will
be higher than inflation rates that exist under monetary independence.
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Proof. Suppose that in a symmetric equilibrium, for any given capital tax rate
in country 1 and country 2, the optimal inflation rate under monetary independence is
higher than that under common currency, namely ∗ ≥ ∗ for  ∈ {1 2} Substituting
these inflation rates into the first order conditions of the optimization problem of central
exchange in country  under monetary independence, and into that of central exchange of the
currency union, the following must be true under any capital tax rates: 12
¡ + ∗  ¢ ³¡ +¢+ ∗ ³ +  ´´
This requires the following to hold: 0
³

³
    ∗
´´
 0
³

³
   ∗  ∗
´´

and hence 
³
    ∗
´
 
³
   ∗  ∗
´
. This, however implies that    which is a
contradiction. Hence ∗  ∗ for  ∈ {1 2}
Theorem 3 Inflation elasticities of national currencies determine whether capital taxes
will be higher or lower under currency union.
Proof. First order conditions obtained from optimization problems of government
and central exchange under monetary independence yield:
 = 1(1+)(1+12 +) and 
 = 1
(1+)

1
+−


This yields: 12 (∗ ) = 1− +  − 
 − ∗
Suppose we increase  to  Then we have:
∆ (∗ ) = ∆
³
 − 
´
− ∆∗
Since the elasticity of capital is monotonic in  i.e.   0, we have:
∆∗  0 if ∆
³
 − 
´
 ∆∗
∆∗  0 if ∆
³
 − 
´
 ∆∗
28
CHAPTER III
ELDERLY MIGRATION AND STATE TAXES
Introduction
In a federal system, jurisdictions will diﬀer in their provision of public goods and
in their imposition of taxes. If individuals can move freely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
then all else equal, each individual will move to a jurisdiction that best suits his or her
preferences for public goods and taxes. This idea constitutes the essence of the ‘Tiebout
Hypothesis’. According to Tiebout (1956):
“The consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community which best
satisfies his preference pattern for public goods. [...] At the local level vari-
ous governments have their revenue and expenditure patterns more or less set.
Given these revenue and expenditure patterns, the consumer-voter moves to
that community whose local government best satisfies his set of preferences.”
(p.418)
It is thus natural to ask: in exactly what way do local governments’ public-good-
provision and tax policies aﬀect individuals’ migration decisions? This question can perhaps
best be answered by investigating the eﬀect of local government policies on the interstate
migration of the elderly population in the US.
The primary benefit of focusing on elderly migration is that the elderly population
consists primarily of retirees, and as a group retirees are relatively immune to labor market
causalities and to other factors that aﬀect the income stream of the working population.
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Although positive labor market aspects and high levels of expected income may be inviting
for younger migrants, elderly migrants do not need to consider labor market aspects in their
migration decision. With labor market considerations left aside, one would expect public
finance variables and local amenities to manifest themselves more clearly in the migration
decisions of elderly migrants than in those of younger migrants. Thus, by focusing on
elderly migration, one is left with a relatively clear and undistorted view of the eﬀects of
state governments’ policy decisions on interstate migration.
There is in addition a second more practical benefit of focusing research on elderly
migration: the empirical results obtained can be expected to have significant policy im-
plications. The share of the elderly population is increasing, and according to the Bureau
of Census reports, it is expected to increase further. In order to take advantage of the
opportunities posed by such increase, and conversely to face the challenges posed by such
increase, governments at the state and local level (and indeed also at the federal level) will
need to focus more thought and resources on the elderly population.
This paper investigates the eﬀects of state and local government policies on the
migration decisions of the elderly. What policies attract the elderly and what policies drive
them away? How do the elderly react to diﬀerent types of taxes? How do amenities and
specific tax exemptions aﬀect their migration decisions?
Under the assumption that individuals, on average, behave in a way that maxi-
mizes their utility, they eventually reveal their preferences by the choices they make. This
revelation principle lies at the core of the Tiebout Hypothesis. When faced with alternative
‘fiscal menus,’ that is, with various combinations of local public goods and local taxes to
finance these local public goods, individuals will sort themselves into jurisdictions on the
basis of their preferences for such menus. Using a gravity model for migration, this paper
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investigates what kinds of ‘fiscal menus’ are popular among elderly migrants in the U.S.,
and what kinds are not.
We employ the elderly migration dataset published in a 2003 special report of the
2000 Census, entitled "Internal Migration of the Older Population." We overlay the data of
elderly migration flows between states with data about state characteristics, in particular
data about state and local government finances, but also data about certain state-specific
amenities. That way, we constructed a gravity equation that takes into account pushing
eﬀects of the origin state’s characteristics as well as pulling eﬀects of destination state’s
characteristics.
Most of the previous studies that investigate interstate migration using gravity
models have shown that when state level data is used for migration analysis, a problem
known as the ‘same sign problem’ occurs. In a gravity model of interstate migration,
pushing and pulling eﬀects are expected to have opposite signs: if some characteristic of a
state positively aﬀects out-migrants’ decisions to move out, the same characteristic should
not also positively aﬀect in-migrants’ decisions to move in. The ‘same sign problem’ refers to
the phenomenon that pushing and pulling eﬀects often turn out to have the same sign. The
same sign problem can generally be attributed either to aggregation, which is an inevitable
result of using state level data, or to the heterogeneity of in- and out-migrating populations.
Our main contribution is to demonstrate that the relative attractiveness of states’
‘fiscal menus’ becomes more apparent when migrations over very short distances and very
long distances are left out of the regressions. The same is also true when outmigration solely
from higher per-capita income states is considered. The probable reason for this is that these
two methods provide some correction for the heterogeneity within the population of elderly
migrants. Migrations over either very short distances or very long distances might be noisy
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because they are more heavily influenced by non-fiscal considerations, such as the cost of
moving or the location of children or grandchildren. In the case of restricting the analysis
to outmigration from higher income states, the likelihood is that the focus is predominantly
on more aﬄuent migrants, and thus not on ‘counter-stream’ migrants who might be able
to successfully free ride on the higher amenity oﬀerings of high tax states.
Background
Most empirical research on elderly migration focuses on determining the main
factors that attract elderly migrants. Graves (1979) investigates in-migration rates across
diﬀerent age groups for large metropolitan areas and finds that the main attractions for mi-
grants diﬀer significantly by age group: young migrants’ decisions are aﬀected by economic
opportunities presented by a location, while elderly migrants tend to be attracted by the
amenities of a location. Similarly, Clark and Hunter (1992) compare diﬀerent age groups’
migration decisions and find that the existence of amenities aﬀects migration decisions of
older migrants more than that of younger migrants.
Elderly migration is necessarily aﬀected by the costs and benefits of migration.
The benefits are a location’s amenities, including local public goods; the costs are the taxes
that must be paid when living in that specific location. Focusing on taxes, Cebula (1990)
shows that the mere existence of a state income tax has a significant negative eﬀect on the
volume of elderly in-migration. Conway and Houtenville (2001) confirm that the elderly
are attracted to states with amenities, including suitable climate conditions and a low cost
of living. In addition, they show that an exemption of food from sales tax induces elderly
in-migration. Somewhat less intuitively, they also report that lower spending on public
welfare induces elderly in-migration.
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No matter if one uses two separate equations for in-migration and out-migration, or
a single gravity equation, a given explanatory variable would be expected to have opposite
signs for the case of in-migration and for the case of out-migration. That is, if a given
variable is found to be a significant factor driving the elderly out of a jurisdiction, then
one would expect this very same variable to be a significant factor keeping the elderly from
migrating into a jurisdiction. Conway and Houtenville (1998) use in-migration and out-
migration estimations for testing the eﬀects of several fiscal variables on elderly migration
across states. Surprisingly, they find that all tax variables — property tax, sales tax and
income tax — have the same sign in both the in-migration and the out-migration estimations:
“All of the tax share coeﬃcients are positive and statistically significant. ...
[Moreover] these results cannot be dismissed; the public sector variables are
almost always jointly statistically significant.” (pp.678-9)
Conway and Houtenville (2001) employ a gravity model of migration, and this
model confirms the results in Conway and Houtenville (1998), including the ‘same sign prob-
lem.’ A descriptive explanation for this phenomenon is oﬀered in Conway and Houtenville
(2001), and some insight can be found in Voss et al. (1988) as well. As it turns out,
the states that have the highest in-migration rates also happen to be the states that have
the highest out-migration rates. Voss et al (1988) refer to the highly positive correla-
tion between in-migration and out-migration as ‘counter-stream migration.’ It is due to
‘counter-stream migration’ that the regression results carry the same signs for in-migration
and out-migration. While this may well be true as a descriptive matter, it fails to provide
a satisfactory explanation for the causes underlying the phenomenon.
Some research has put forward the theory that the availability of amenities in
a jurisdiction may be partially (or even completely) compensated for in such jurisdiction’s
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labor and real estate markets. That is, if amenities vary across jurisdictions, then in general
equilibrium we would expect some wage and rent compensation to occur, for otherwise
everyone would live solely in amenity-rich jurisdictions. See for example, Haurin (1980)
and Roback (1982). Graves and Waldman (1991) examine this theory under the plausible
assumption that the elderly constitute a small group, whose migration decision cannot
aﬀect the wage structure in the jurisdiction to which they are migrating. They provide
empirical evidence to show that "in a world in which compensation for amenities occurs in
varying degree in land and labor markets at alternative sites and there are no moving costs,
retirement migration will be toward areas in which more of the compensation for amenities
is in wages." (p.1376). This is not surprising: the elderly generally can free ride to the extent
that compensation for amenities occurs in the labor market, but they generally cannot free
ride to the extent that compensation occurs in the real estate market.
Conway and Rork (2006) focus on another important factor that could aﬀect el-
derly migration: estate, inheritance and gift taxes. Using panel data, they surprisingly
discover that estate, inheritance and gift tax policies do not aﬀect elderly migration.
In this paper, we use indicator variables for the exemption of social security pay-
ments from state income taxation, the exemption of pension income from state income
taxation, the exemption of drug sales from state sales taxes, and for the existence of atypi-
cal state inheritance or gift taxes. The indicator variable for inheritance or gift taxes turns
out to be significant for most of the specifications; moreover, it does not have a same sign
problem.
Model
There are  states, and  retirees. A retiree, , derives utility from private
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consumption , and from bundle of state specific public good  and amenities , so that
the utility function of retiree  is given by:  ()
Axiom 1  () is a twice diﬀerentiable, and concave function in all of its arguments.
Axiom 2  () is strictly increasing in 
Axiom 3 There exist ∗ such that (∗) = 0 for given  and , and there exists ∗
such that (
∗)
 = 0 for given  and  Moreover, for every 0  ∗ (
0)
  0
and for every 1  ∗ (1)  0 Similarly, for every 0  ∗ (
0)
  0
and for every 1  ∗ (1)  0
If a retiree chooses to reside in state  she will enjoy state specific public goods
and amenities,  and  and the utility of retiree  in state  is given by  (  ) 
However she will have to face state specific price level  as well as state taxes  and   State
taxes are grouped in two broad classes: Taxes related to consumption and living expenses,
and taxes related to wealth and income. Sales taxes and property taxes can be examples
for taxes related to consumption and living expenses. As far taxes related to wealth and
income are concerned, retirees are not wage earners, however they may be receiving pension
and/or social security payments, which are subject to income tax as well.
Price level and taxes in a state aﬀect an individual’s budget constraint for private
consumption. Even though a state’s public good provision and amenities may be attrac-
tive to a retiree, if price level and menu of taxes restrict her private good consumption
considerably, she may not choose to move to that state.
Another variable aﬀecting a retiree’s decision to move from state  to  is the
moving cost, which is a function of the distance,  between state  and state , denoted
by  () 
Axiom 4 Moving cost function  () from state  to state  is strictly increasing and
convex in distance,  
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Suppose that a retiree  is initially residing in state . The solution of the following
optimization problem shows her utility, if she moves from state  to state 
  = max  (  )  such that ( + ) ≤ 
¡
1− 
¢−  ()
where  is wealth of retiree  which she has accumulated for her retirement.
It is easy to see that the optimization problem (1)-(2) yields the following outcome:
  = 
Ã ¡1− ¢
 +  −
 ()
 +     
!
(III.1)
If retiree  chooses to stay in state  her initial location, then her utility will be:
  = 
µ (1− )
 +    
¶
(III.2)
Retiree  decides whether to stay or to move to another state as follows: Let ∗
denote the set of retiree ’s best possible alternatives to staying in state , so that:
∗ = max
¡ 1   2    −1   +1    ¢ (III.3)
Hence retiree moves from state  to state  if and only if   ∈ ∗      
A retiree makes her decision of relocation from state  to state  based on vector of
parameters
¡          ¢ oﬀered by state  These parameters of state  are price
level, consumption tax, income tax, public good provision, amenities, and distance to origin
state. Suppose that retiree  is initially residing in state  and conditions of migration are
satisfied for state  that is:   ∈ ∗ and     
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It is interesting to see how these parameters should interact in order to keep utility
derived from migration constant, other things being equal. The following three propositions
focus on parameters’ pairwise interactions, that are of interest especially in our empirical
analysis. Their proofs are in appendix.
Proposition 1 (Public Goods or Amenities vs. Consumption or Income Tax): An increase
in public good provision in a state may be accompanied by either an increase or decrease in
taxes to keep constant the attractiveness of state for a given retiree. Since preferences are
single peaked in public goods and amenities, whether an increase or decrease is necessary in
taxes, depends on how levels of public goods and amenities compare to their most optimal
levels.
Proof. We obtain from (III.1) by total diﬀerentiation:
  = 1 + 


Ã
− − 0 +
 ()−  ¡1− ¢
 +  ( + )
!
+
+

  +

 
Holding other variables constant, we compare a change in public good provision
and a change in income tax, which is necessary to keep   constant:
 =  + 



From axiom 3, we know that any retiree’s preferences over public good provision
are single peaked, that is "there exist ∗ such that (∗) = 0 for given  and , and
there exists ∗ such that (∗) = 0 for given  and  Moreover, for every 0  ∗
(0)
  0 and for every 1  ∗ (
1)
  0” Then,   0 if   0 and
  0 if   0
Similarly, comparing change in level of amenities and change in income tax:
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 =  + 



Since any retiree’s preferences over level of amenities are single peaked, it follows
that   0 if   0 and   0 if   0
Using the same methodology, one can easily establish the relation between con-
sumption tax and level of amenities or public goods, and the sign of this relation mainly
depends on whether   ∗ or   ∗
Proposition 2 (Price Level vs. Consumption Tax): In order to keep constant the attrac-
tiveness of a state for any retiree, an increase in price level needs to be matched by a one
to one consumption tax decrease.
Proof. From (III.2) we obtain ( + ) = 0 by total diﬀerentiation. Hence
 = − 
Proposition 3 (Distance vs. Consumption or Income Tax): If two states have the same
attractiveness for a retiree, and have diﬀerent distances from retiree’s state of origin, then,
other things equal, the further away state has lower consumption and income taxes. Dif-
ference in income tax is proportional to marginal cost of moving, and inversely related to
retiree’s wealth. Diﬀerence in consumption tax is proportional to marginal cost of moving
as well, but it is inversely related to net wealth, and proportional to price level.
Proof. Using the total diﬀerential of   we obtain the following result for changes
in distance and income tax:
 = −
0
 
Using the total diﬀerential of   we obtain the following result for changes in
distance and consumption tax:
 = −
0 ( + )
 ¡1− ¢−  ()
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Data and Methodology
Interstate migration data of the elderly population between years 1995 and 2000
are provided by the 2000 Census. Migration flows are determined by the change in residence
of the elderly from 1995 to 2000, and the dataset is displayed as state of residency in 2000
is shown sorted by the state of residency in 1995. Elderly population contains those who
are 65 years old and older, and this data doesn’t contain migration flow from outside the
US.
Data about the local and state government finances is obtained from the US Cen-
sus Bureau’s "Local and State Governments’ Finances, 1993-94” online dataset. State
population and state personal income data are from the Bureau of the Economic Analysis.
Cost of living index is obtained from state level consumer price indexes constructed
by Berry et al (2000), and we used these consumer price indexes to obtain state real personal
income figures.
We use a gravity equation of the following form:
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ln = + 1 ln  + 2 + 1 ln  + 2 ln  +
+3 + 4 + 5 + 6 +
+7 ln  + 8 ln  + 9 + 10 +
+11 ln  + 12 ln  +
+13 + 14 ++15 + 16 +
+17 + 18
+19 + 20 + 21 + 22 +
+231 + 241 + 252 + 262 + 
Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of number of elderly migrants from
state  to state . Description of independent variables: ( is the constant term; independent
variables in lower case letters denote natural logarithm)
 : Distance of population centers between states  and 
 : A dummy variable for neighbor states. If states  and  share a common
border, it becomes one, otherwise it is zero.
 : Total population of respective state
 : Population density of respective state, found by dividing state’s total pop-
ulation by its area.
 : Ratio of urban population to total population in a state.
 : Crime rate in a state
 : Annual average temperature in major locations in a state.
 : Consumer price index in a state
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 : An indicator variable for amenities. If a state is an amenity-rich, A=1, and if
a state is amenity-poor, A=0, following the indicator developed by Greenwood et al (1991).
 : Vector consisting of property tax (state average), general sales tax, individ-
ual income tax, corporate income tax, and other tax revenue. All tax rates are calculated
using ‘State and Local Goverment Finances’ data, by taking the ratio of revenue from each
type of tax to state personal income. Inheritance tax is included in form of an indicator
variable, taking the value 1 if a state imposes inheritance tax, and 0 if not.
 : This vector includes two revenue items that are not covered by state and
local government revenue obtained by taxation. These are revenue from federal transfers
(calculated as a ratio to state personal income), and total charges (calculated as a ratio to
state population).
 : This is a vector of three indicator variables that indicate whether so-
cial security payments, pensions, and drug sales are exempt from income and sales tax,
respectively.
 : Public spending vector- includes expenditures on education, health,
hospitals, highways, public transport, police, fire protection, parks and recreation. All
variables are calculated by dividing the total expenditure of state and local governments by
population of the state, hence expenditure variables are stated in per capita terms.
1 : (denoted by inter11 in regression results) This is the interaction term for
individual income tax rate and pension exemption.
2 : (denoted by inter14a in regression results) This is the interaction term
for logarithm of crime and urbanization ratio.
Before we proceed to estimation results in next section, it is worthwhile to make
some comments about the dataset. We look at the migration inflow and outflow of 48 states
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(that is, excluding Alaska, Hawaii and District of Columbia), and the gravity equation
estimation uses a total of 48 × 47 = 2256 observations. We don’t consider within state
migrations, and we drop those migration state-pairs which indicate zero migration for 1995-
2000 period.
As it can be seen from figure 1, diﬀerent states enjoy diﬀerent levels of elderly in-
and outmigration. A reasonable suspect that might cause such diﬀerences across states is
state and local level public finance variables.
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Figure 1. Elderly Migration in and out of states as a percentage total elderly population
Empirical Findings
Tables 1 through 6, that are located at the end of this chapter, display the regres-
sion results for three diﬀerent specifications of elderly migration data. All three specifica-
tions pass Pregibon’s link test, so that they do not contain a specification error with 95%
confidence.
Column (1) is based on total migration between states. As explained in the theo-
retical section, diﬀerences between origin and destination states’ policy variables are likely
to become clearer as moves over greater distances are considered, since such diﬀerences
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must be suﬃcient to overcome the costs of moving. In particular, since the migration cost
function is assumed to be convex, regression analysis of shorter distance migrations will be
very noisy.
Accordingly, Columns (3) and (4) show regression results that are run under certain
restrictions on distance. Distance between two states is measured as the distance between
the population centers of the two states.
Column (2) contains only net migration numbers, where net migration is equal to
the diﬀerence between in-migrants and out-migrants.
Column (5) seeks to reduce the noise in the net migration regression. Thus, we
include only those state pairs that have significant net migration, to wit a net migration
ratio of at least 0.13. In addition, we include only origin states with relatively aﬄuent per
capita income of between $20,000 and $30,000. The rationale for this restriction is that it
reduces the likelihood that the analysis will be too noisy due to less aﬄuent ‘counter-stream’
migrants who might seek to free ride on the higher amenity oﬀerings of high tax states.
Finally, the regression displayed in Column (6) is also based on net migration data.
It contains all state pairs that have a net migration rate of at least 0.14. This time there is
no constraint on distance or on the origin state’s per capita income. We show this regression
mainly to stress how it can diﬀer from the regression in Column (2), and how noisy the
results can get, even when we are dealing with net migration data.
The regressions show that there is more elderly migration to neighboring states
than to more distant states. Moreover, if neighboring states are removed from the data set
(and even if they are not), the amount of elderly migration between two states decreases as
the distance between such states increases. This is hardly surprising — Conway-Houtenville
(2001) report the same results — and is likely due to the confluence of a number of factors.
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For example, the direct costs of moving surely increase with distance. In addition, the degree
of familiarity with prospective destinations almost surely decreases with distance, and that
in turn should have a depressing eﬀect on long-distance migration. Note however that latter
explanation is likely to become less significant over time: as the fraction of the elderly who
are proficient users of the internet increases, the costs associated with becoming familiar
with prospective distant destinations will decrease. Thus, we would expect the negative
eﬀect of distance on elderly migration to moderate somewhat in the future.
Our regressions show that the elderly both migrate to states with larger popu-
lations and migrate away from states with larger populations. These results confirm an
identical ‘same sign problem’ reported in Conway-Houtenville (2001). There may be a sim-
ple explanation. People are social animals; they like to go where there are other people.
(Indeed, they like to go where there are other people like themselves, as Gale-Heath report
in the case of the elderly. That study, too, is consistent with our results.) But they also
necessarily predominantly come from places where there are other people. Nor does this
explanation lose its force when examining net migration. For example, while the gross
flow from New York to West Virginia may not be significantly diﬀerent from the net flow,
whereas the gross flow from New York to Florida may be vastly greater than the net flow,
nevertheless even on a net basis New Yorkers are much more likely to go to Florida than
West Virginia.
This variable presents another same sign problem. In the case of gross migration,
the elderly tend to avoid migrating to states with higher population densities, but they also
tend to remain in states with higher population densities. One possible explanation is that
these results reflect two separate flows: one from cities to suburbs and the other from the
country to suburbs.
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Our regressions show somewhat mixed results of the eﬀects of temperature on
elderly migration. On balance, the elderly prefer to move to warmer climes, and the findings
are at least in some of the regressions weakly significant. This is unsurprising, and is not
inconsistent with Gale-Heath, who report a statistically significant avoidance by migrants
of states with a greater number of heating days, i.e., of colder states. Moreover, in four of
our regressions, the elderly also exhibit a reluctance to migrate away from warmer climes,
although these results are not significant. However, our two remaining regressions, the
elderly behave unexpectedly: they strongly significantly move away from warmer climes.
We could perhaps tell a story of the happy middle: the elderly may prefer more temperate
climes to both colder and hotter ones. In any event, similarly inconsistent results occur
in Conway-Houtenville (1998) and Conway-Houtenville (2001). Both of those studies use
three diﬀerent weather-related variables: sun, heating degrees and cooling degrees. The
1998 study reported as significant findings both that the elderly avoid migrating to the sun,
but also that they migrate to states with a larger number of cooling degrees; the latter
finding, but not the former, indicates a preference for states that are warmer. In addition,
the 1998 study reported that the elderly migrate to states with a larger number of heating
degrees; that would seem to indicate a preference for states that are cooler. The 2001 study
does not clarify matters: the results abound in same sign issues and uniformly contradict
the significant findings from 1998.
Our regressions show that there is more elderly migration to states with higher
property taxes. This result, which is strongly significant, is inconsistent with that reported
by Gale-Heath, but is consistent with that reported in Conway-Houtenville (1998) and in
Conway-Houtenville (2001). While the result is at first counterintuitive, it may be the
result of one of two factors. First, higher property taxes are generally strongly correlated
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with higher levels of locally provided amenities, and it may simply be the case that the
elderly migrate towards such amenities. Second, property taxes are usually an increasing
function of the value and hence generally of the size of the property. Since the elderly are
predominantly empty-nesters, they may own properties that are on average smaller than
those that predominate in a given locale. If this were so, the elderly may to some extent
be able to "free ride" oﬀ of the property taxes paid by others. Moreover, their ability to
successfully engage in such free-riding will be greater the higher the level of property taxes.
The likelihood that one of these phenomena (or something very much like one of these
phenomena) explains our results is enhanced by a glance at the net migration regressions.
These regressions generally report (albeit not significantly) that the elderly migrate away
from low property tax states. Assuming a modicum of rationality, the elderly would only flee
from low taxation if they are well compensated for such flight. Finally, in the case of gross
migration, a same sign problem appears; the elderly weakly significantly move away from
high property taxes. This same sign problem also appears in Conway-Houtenville (1998)
and in Conway-Houtenville (2001). A possible explanation may be a general preference for
retiring in suburbia. Thus, when the elderly are confronted with the very high property
taxes of big cities, they move away. But once outside of the big city setting, they may prefer
more amenities to fewer.
In the case of general sales tax data, our regression results present a same sign
problem. The elderly migrate to states where sales taxes are low. That is surely uncontro-
versial. But they also migrate away from states where sales taxes are low. Both of these
results are significant only for gross migration, but they do retain their sign for net migra-
tion. One possibility is that more nuanced data would provide an explanation, but this is
pure speculation on our part. For example, the elderly are likely to be disproportionately
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aﬀected by sales taxes on food and medicine. If so, they could rationally prefer a state
that collects a high overall amount of sales tax, but that imposes a low rate of tax on food
and medicines, to a state that collects a low overall amount of sales tax, but that does
not grant preferential treatment to food and medicine. This is because the elderly could
free ride oﬀ sales tax revenues in the first posited state, but not the second. Moreover, the
existence of states, and even more of localities within states, that diﬀer along these two
dimensions means that it is simultaneously possible for some elderly to move to low sales
tax states that also oﬀer a generalized respite from high taxation, while others leave low
sales tax states that, in spite of their generally low sales taxes, oﬀer no particular benefits
to consumers of food and medicine. Our data cannot definitively speak to the foregoing
conjecture. However, we do have a dummy variable that measures whether or not a state
exempts drug sales from its general sales tax. Thus, we can confirm that the elderly migrate
to states that exempt drugs from their general sales tax. However, our data also show that
the elderly migrate away from states that exempt drugs from their general sales tax. Both
of these results are uniformly significant in the case of gross migrations, but not in the case
of net migrations. Moreover, since only five states, and only one state with a significant
population (Illinois), do not provide a sales tax exemption for drugs, the results may be
suspect.
Comparing our results to other studies, Gale-Heath do not report a result that
is statistically significant with respect to the level of sales taxes. However, they do report
that a positive change in sales tax rates, i.e., a sales tax increase, significantly reduces
the amount of net in-migration. Conway-Houtenville (1998), in turn, report a same sign
problem, albeit the opposite one we confront: their elderly statistically significantly migrate
to states with high sales taxes; they insignificantly migrate away from states with high sales
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taxes. Conway-Houtenville (2001) confirm their 1998 result for gross migration flows, but
for net migration flows obtain the least intuitively appealing result possible, namely that
higher sales taxes tend both to attract elderly migrants to a state and to keep potential
elderly migrants from migrating out of a state. However, neither of these last two results is
significant.
In our study, we coupled the individual income tax data with the data on mean-
ingful income tax exemptions for pension or retirement income by means of an interaction
variable. While the results are not uniform across the various regressions, and mostly not
significant, at least some tell an intuitively appealing story. Thus, in the case of net migra-
tions, two of the three regressions show that the elderly do not migrate to high income tax
states that do not oﬀer a meaningful pension exemption, but do migrate to high income
tax states that oﬀer such an exemption. Moreover, two of the three regressions show that
the elderly migrate out of states that couple high income taxes with no meaningful pension
exemption, but tend to stay in states that couple high income taxes with a meaningful
pension exemption. Thus, the elderly appear to dislike income taxes if and only if they are
the ones who are required to pay them! Nirvana is a state with high income taxes that are
disproportionately paid by others.
Turning to the gross migration data, the elderly significantly avoid migrating to
high income tax states, but their aversion to such states is mitigated somewhat if the
state oﬀers a meaningful income tax exemption for some pension income. In addition, the
elderly tend to stay in states with high income taxes; a tendency that becomes even more
pronounced if the state couples high income taxes with a meaningful pension exemption. We
suspect this same sign problem has an explanation along the lines suggested by our analysis
of the pension exemption in the prior paragraph. While our data set treats the elderly as
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a single group, the fact remains that the elderly are not homogenous. Specifically, we can
think of two distinct subsets that might react very diﬀerently to state income tax rules:
the wealthy elderly and the poor elderly. The wealthy elderly continue to earn significant
amounts of income, not just from pensions, but also from investments and other sources;
the poor elderly have little income beyond that provided by Social Security. All else equal,
we would expect the wealthy elderly to avoid states with high income taxes. But we would
not expect similar behavior from the poor elderly, as they are not the ones paying the high
income taxes and as they presumably get at least some measure of amenity benefit from
the state expenditures financed by the high income taxes imposed on others.
Comparing our results with those obtained by others, we note that Conway-
Houtenville (1998) report the opposite same sign problem that we confront, albeit the
same one they reported for general sales taxes. That is, their elderly significantly migrate
away from states with high income taxes, but also strongly significantly migrate to states
with high income taxes. They further report that ‘provisions in the income tax code that
exempt pension income have no bearing on either in-migration or out-migration,’ but do not
explain how they arrived at this conclusion. Conway-Houtenville (2001) in turn confirms
the same sign problem of their earlier study, but the results are not significant.
Finally, we also looked at the response of the elderly to a complete exemption of
Social Security receipts from state income taxation. We found that while the elderly migrate
to states that do not tax social security receipts, they also migrate away from states that do
not tax such receipts. While these results are significant in the case of gross migration, it is
diﬃcult to ascribe much meaning to them. The reason is that while ‘only’ thirty-five states
exempt all social security receipts from taxation, those states include all of the biggest states
in terms of population as well as every single state that falls into the category of being a
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traditional retirement haven.
Our regressions based on net migration data show that the elderly significantly
migrate to states that collect higher amounts of corporate income tax, but they also albeit
not significantly migrate out of states that collect higher amounts of corporate income tax.
The former result is intuitively appealing, since corporate income taxes present perhaps the
ultimate opportunity for a free ride on the part of the elderly. The latter result, were it
significant, might prove diﬃcult to explain; perhaps high corporate income tax collections
are correlated with some other undesirable feature of a state, such as having a rust-belt
economy. But it is not significant. Finally, our regressions based on gross migration data
report the perverse result that the elderly do not migrate to states with high corporate
income tax collections and moreover migrate away from states with high corporate income
tax collections. Fortunately, neither of these results is significant.
Our regressions show that both in terms of gross migration and in terms of net
migration, the elderly strongly significantly migrate to states with high levels of so-called
‘other taxes’; no similarly significant results were obtained for out-migration. The significant
results are intuitively appealing when we consider a tax such as a natural resources severance
tax or a documentary or stock transfer tax; such taxes provide a clear opportunity for
free-riding on the part of the elderly. The results seem less appealing in the case of a
death tax or a gift tax, both of which are also conflated into the ‘other taxes’ category,
albeit as a small piece thereof. Thus, we separately tested the response of the elderly to
what we call inheritance taxes, which include any taxes above and beyond the common
baseline determined by the IRC Section 2011 credit. We find that the elderly strongly
significantly migrate to states that do not impose any such incremental tax on bequests or
other transfers. This is an intuitively appealing result, for while only a small fraction of the
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elderly population is subject to such transfer taxes, that fraction of the population is both
mobile (they are wealthy) and motivated to avoid such incremental taxes. Our results for
migration out of states on the basis of incremental transfer taxes are not similarly significant;
in the case of net migration, the sign is the expected sign; in the case of gross migration, it
is not. Finally, note that Conway-Houtenville (2001) confirms that the elderly do not move
to states with high ‘death taxes.’
Our regressions produce only a handful of significant results for the various gov-
ernment spending variables. First, the elderly do not like to migrate to states with high per
capita spending on education. This result is intuitively appealing, as the elderly no longer
have children who are likely to be beneficiaries of such education spending. Moreover, the
same result appears in Conway-Houtenville (1998) and Conway-Houtenville (2001). How-
ever, those studies both report that the elderly are also reluctant to leave states with high
levels of education spending. While some of our regressions confirm this same-sign problem,
the results are not significant.
Second, the elderly prefer to migrate to states with high per capita government
spending on health care and hospitals. This is intuitively appealing, as the elderly make
disproportionate use of health care and hospitals. Surprisingly, Conway-Houtenville (1998)
and Conway-Houtenville (2001) obtain the opposite result. Nonetheless, their results indi-
cated that the elderly migrated away from states with low spending on hospitals.
Third, the elderly prefer to migrate to states with high per capita government
spending on police. This too is appealing: the elderly are surely disproportionately vul-
nerable and thus would be expected to place additional value on police protection. Note,
however, that in the case of gross migration, there is also a significant tendency for the
elderly to move away from states with high per capita spending on police. A possible expla-
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nation is that high expenditures for police may be correlated with some other undesirable
characteristic of a state, such as being highly urban and therefore having high crime rates.
Finally, the elderly prefer to migrate to states that have higher per capita govern-
ment spending on parks and recreation. This is again an appealing result, since the elderly
as a class have more leisure time to enjoy such amenities. Nonetheless, the news here is
not unambiguous, as in the case of gross migration, the elderly also significantly move away
from states with high per capita spending on parks and recreation. As with most same sign
problems, these results may be masking some heterogeneity either in the elderly or in the
variable itself. That is, while some of the elderly may benefit from spending on parks and
recreation, others may be unwilling or unable to use public recreation facilities. Moreover,
in some states, the funded facilities may be of the sort that are attractive to the elderly,
while in others they might be of the sort that are more attractive to the young (e.g., rugged
hiking paths or playgrounds).
A significant and surprising finding is that the elderly do not appear to be attracted
to states that derive a larger share of their revenues from the Federal government. One would
expect the reverse to be true: from the vantage of a state’s residents, funds received from
the Federal government allow the state to provide amenities without any need for the state
to impose any directly corresponding taxes or fees. Why would the elderly eschew such a
free ride? A possible explanation is that the mere fact of greater Federal revenues may be
masking some other undesirable feature of a state. For example, a state may receive greater
Federal revenues because it is poor and therefore has a greater need for such revenues. Or
a state may receive greater Federal revenues because it has a more powerful and perhaps
concomitantly more corrupt political establishment (in which case the funds may not be
spent in a manner that benefits the residents at large). In either of these cases, a rational
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retiree might well choose to avoid the Federal handout.
Our regressions show that he elderly are less likely to migrate to states that impose
higher fees and other charges. It is somewhat unclear whether this is an expected result.
One can imagine three possibilities with respect to a service that a state could provide and
that is targeted to the elderly. First, the state could choose not to provide the service,
and thus force the cost of the service onto the elderly. Second, the state could provide the
service, but could charge the elderly an appropriate fee. Third, the state could provide the
service, but could pay for it out of general revenues. The first and the third possibility
involve low government fees, but only the third actually benefits the elderly. Similarly, one
can imagine three possibilities with respect to a service that a state could provide and that
is not targeted to the elderly. First, the state could choose not to provide the service, and
thus force the cost of the service onto those who make use of the service. Second, the state
could provide the service, but could charge the users an appropriate fee. Third, the state
could provide the service, but could pay for it out of general revenues. The first and the
third possibility involve low government fees, but now the third actually operates against
the interests of the elderly. Finally, note that, at least in the case of gross migration, our
regressions also show that the elderly tend to stay in states that impose higher fees and
other charges. As suggested by the foregoing discussion, and particularly given the wide
variety of fees and charges, an explanation based on the heterogeneity of the elderly is the
likely cause of this same sign problem.
While not all of our results are significant, our regressions show that the elderly
tend to migrate to states with a lower cost of living and away from states with a higher cost
of living. Since many of the elderly live on a fixed income — i.e., an income that does not
change in response to changes in price levels — this is exactly the behavior we would expect:
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retirees move to states where their incomes go farther. Our results are consistent with those
reported in Gale-Heath, Conway-Houtenville (1998) and Conway-Houtenville (2001).
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Table 1. Gravity Regression Results-1
(1) (2) (3)
lnmig lnnetmig lnmig
neighbor 0.8162 0.3547
(12.97)** (2.22)*
lndistance -1.0804 -0.9967 -1.1483
(40.76)** (15.14)** (36.17)**
lnpopulationto 0.8393 0.6054 0.8064
(18.83)** (5.11)** (16.80)**
lnpopulationfrom 0.9363 0.7782 0.9232
(20.51)** (6.81)** (18.64)**
urbanto -27.8890 -55.8080 -32.8224
(4.82)** (4.48)** (5.30)**
urbanfrom -12.7542 -22.7924 -15.8463
(2.12)* (1.68) (2.44)*
lncrimeto -1.3810 -3.1073 -1.8560
(2.89)** (3.07)** (3.65)**
lncrimefrom -0.5408 -1.7943 -0.7788
(1.05) (1.46) (1.42)
temperatureto 0.0012 0.0023 0.0013
(2.06)* (1.62) (2.19)*
temperaturefrom 0.0020 -0.0016 0.0020
(3.31)** (1.05) (3.22)**
propertytaxincomeratioto 17.2457 40.6023 20.0104
(3.86)** (4.59)** (4.18)**
propertytaxincomeratiofrom 11.6799 27.6537 10.6682
(2.55)* (2.57)* (2.15)*
generalsalestaxincomeratioto -11.3800 -0.4516 -10.1263
(3.27)** (0.06) (2.64)**
generalsalestaxincomeratiofrom -11.6041 3.6990 -12.7523
(3.11)** (0.42) (3.06)**
indincometaxincomeratioto -19.0123 -3.9341 -19.2020
(4.37)** (0.47) (4.09)**
indincometaxincomeratiofrom -8.9443 3.3779 -9.9360
(1.99)* (0.25) (2.02)*
corpincometaxincomeratioto -10.5176 22.3682 -3.2890
(0.90) (0.71) (0.26)
corpincometaxincomeratiofrom 8.6123 -0.3056 10.0896
(0.74) (0.01) (0.78)
othertaxincomeratioto 38.2787 81.6333 42.1656
(5.13)** (4.89)** (5.15)**
othertaxincomeratiofrom 12.6657 30.7428 12.9909
(1.63) (1.94) (1.51)
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Table 2. Gravity Regression Results-2
(1) (2) (3)
lnmig lnnetmig lnmig
socialsecto 0.1976 -0.0998 0.1935
(3.70)** (0.90) (3.42)**
socialsecfrom 0.1776 0.0753 0.1773
(3.35)** (0.61) (3.14)**
pensionto -0.5200 -0.8063 -0.6212
(4.02)** (3.46)** (4.56)**
pensionfrom -0.0363 -0.1412 -0.0561
(0.27) (0.32) (0.38)
drugsaleto 1.0240 0.3771 1.1445
(11.01)** (1.61) (11.37)**
drugsalefrom 0.6028 0.2104 0.6905
(6.86)** (0.94) (7.47)**
inheritanceto 0.2492 0.6628 0.2601
(5.59)** (6.01)** (5.41)**
inheritancefrom 0.0167 -0.1315 0.0135
(0.38) (1.18) (0.28)
reducationpercapto -12.5675 -80.8115 -13.3170
(0.59) (2.08)* (0.58)
reducationpercapfrom 15.7676 -130.1967 21.7125
(0.72) (2.45)* (0.89)
rhighwayspercapto 12.8896 -96.9277 -19.0536
(0.35) (1.20) (0.47)
rhighwayspercapfrom 63.7847 -7.7981 36.0499
(1.82) (0.10) (0.93)
rhealthhosppercapto 77.6395 166.2222 110.5020
(2.66)** (2.67)** (3.56)**
rhealthhosppercapfrom -15.0345 -11.6543 5.8780
(0.51) (0.16) (0.19)
rpoliceexppercapto 270.3850 -173.3851 374.3915
(2.51)* (0.60) (3.19)**
rpoliceexppercapfrom 246.4005 462.1275 302.6635
(2.26)* (1.82) (2.61)**
rfireexppercapto -83.7932 -89.2778 -161.8793
(0.57) (0.22) (0.99)
rfireexppercapfrom -54.3782 -576.8002 -97.0167
(0.38) (1.70) (0.62)
rparkrecexppercapto 508.2776 1525.0330 642.9306
(4.01)** (4.84)** (4.75)**
rparkrecexppercapfrom 557.2105 298.9487 659.7679
(4.65)** (1.10) (5.22)**
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Table 3. Gravity Resgression Results-3
(1) (2) (3)
lnmig lnnetmig lnmig
rtransitexppercapto 3.3696 139.5161 -11.0652
(0.07) (1.00) (0.22)
rtransitexppercapfrom 45.9260 -71.2508 34.8402
(0.94) (0.68) (0.63)
revenuefedincomeratioto -11.1047 -42.6839 -12.5046
(3.45)** (5.61)** (3.70)**
revenuefedincomeratiofrom 3.2928 14.5643 3.2271
(0.98) (1.84) (0.88)
totchargesrevpercapto -1.5594 -2.0974 -1.9311
(4.82)** (3.07)** (5.76)**
totchargesrevpercapfrom -0.7225 0.3054 -0.9965
(2.34)* (0.39) (3.11)**
densityto -0.0011 0.0002 -0.0012
(5.90)** (0.31) (5.45)**
densityfrom -0.0011 -0.0005 -0.0012
(5.54)** (0.99) (5.65)**
amenityto 0.4912 0.6016 0.4986
(9.04)** (4.47)** (8.51)**
amenityfrom 0.2898 -0.0152 0.3131
(5.54)** (0.12) (5.60)**
inter11to 8.5227 14.6924 13.3333
(1.61) (1.44) (2.34)*
inter11from -5.6674 10.5292 -4.5556
(1.03) (0.64) (0.75)
inter14ato 3.4304 6.4977 4.0471
(4.87)** (4.26)** (5.38)**
inter14afrom 1.6330 2.9338 2.0355
(2.23)* (1.75) (2.59)**
lncpito 0.0034 -3.8953 -0.2821
(0.00) (2.64)** (0.39)
lncpifrom 2.6063 1.4157 2.8488
(3.53)** (0.86) (3.46)**
Constant -19.9365 37.0178 -13.6440
(2.26)* (1.84) (1.42)
Observations 2168 1104 1820
Adjusted R-squared 0.83 0.68 0.82
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Table 4. Gravity Regression Results-4
(4) (5) (6)
lnnetmig lnnetmig lnnetmig
neighbor 0.5339 0.5221
(3.77)** (3.49)**
lndistance -1.0708 -1.0115 -1.0281
(11.60)** (17.38)** (17.45)**
lnpopulationto 0.6199 0.7225 0.7083
(4.24)** (5.59)** (5.47)**
lnpopulationfrom 1.0009 0.7107 0.6952
(9.35)** (3.98)** (3.78)**
urbanto -43.4324 -43.6510 -45.8763
(3.37)** (3.62)** (3.76)**
urbanfrom -21.8048 -66.2385 -40.5425
(1.67) (1.97)* (1.24)
lncrimeto -2.5924 -2.4450 -2.6095
(2.62)** (2.52)* (2.66)**
lncrimefrom -0.9153 -6.1071 -3.5565
(0.79) (1.90) (1.13)
temperatureto 0.0030 0.0021 0.0017
(2.07)* (1.53) (1.23)
temperaturefrom -0.0026 -0.0025 -0.0005
(1.75) (1.12) (0.24)
propertytaxincomeratioto 36.7213 36.8904 36.5853
(3.85)** (4.20)** (4.09)**
propertytaxincomeratiofrom -4.8943 -22.1791 -16.7198
(0.39) (1.61) (1.20)
generalsalestaxincomeratioto -7.8597 -4.5853 -4.0630
(0.89) (0.60) (0.53)
generalsalestaxincomeratiofrom -15.9390 -14.2825 -19.7178
(1.67) (1.32) (1.77)
indincometaxincomeratioto -1.2265 -1.5871 -4.4437
(0.14) (0.20) (0.55)
indincometaxincomeratiofrom -38.6151 1.2875 13.9309
(2.57)* (0.07) (0.76)
corpincometaxincomeratioto 76.3012 70.9971 67.4549
(1.98)* (2.04)* (1.91)
corpincometaxincomeratiofrom 38.7401 61.6090 35.5446
(1.65) (1.13) (0.65)
othertaxincomeratioto 55.1710 63.4705 60.5194
(3.15)** (4.23)** (3.90)**
othertaxincomeratiofrom 0.6182 -0.2264 -0.5568
(0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
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Table 5. Gravity Regression Results-5
(4) (5) (6)
lnnetmig lnnetmig lnnetmig
socialsecto -0.0095 0.0087 0.0278
(0.08) (0.08) (0.26)
socialsecfrom 0.3275 0.0891 0.1071
(2.33)* (0.50) (0.59)
pensionto -0.4021 -0.3768 -0.4532
(1.86) (1.74) (2.05)*
pensionfrom -0.6939 0.3294 0.8376
(1.49) (0.52) (1.47)
drugsaleto 0.4156 0.5210 0.5661
(1.58) (2.18)* (2.31)*
drugsalefrom 0.7427 0.2227 0.3112
(3.21)** (0.52) (0.71)
inheritanceto 0.5231 0.4785 0.4738
(4.27)** (4.24)** (4.07)**
inheritancefrom -0.0004 -0.1169 -0.2142
(0.00) (0.78) (1.51)
reducationpercapto -34.9749 -75.8829 -69.7281
(0.88) (2.19)* (1.99)*
reducationpercapfrom 13.4151 -26.2435 -12.1770
(0.22) (0.53) (0.24)
rhighwayspercapto -74.8913 -63.4880 -57.4101
(0.89) (0.84) (0.75)
rhighwayspercapfrom 155.8296 -0.9777 -29.3559
(1.94) (0.01) (0.25)
rhealthhosppercapto 109.2750 114.7539 124.9705
(1.64) (1.83) (1.96)
rhealthhosppercapfrom 56.8884 145.9241 146.2037
(0.81) (1.17) (1.15)
rpoliceexppercapto 172.3744 198.6687 254.8959
(0.53) (0.72) (0.90)
rpoliceexppercapfrom 160.3986 -249.1431 17.6119
(0.70) (0.47) (0.03)
rfireexppercapto 277.8796 -243.7243 -238.8596
(0.67) (0.72) (0.68)
rfireexppercapfrom -287.7345 503.5377 181.3242
(0.89) (0.63) (0.22)
rparkrecexppercapto 1307.5490 1286.4180 1247.2560
(4.30)** (4.08)** (3.92)**
rparkrecexppercapfrom 432.9613 141.4861 245.4086
(1.73) (0.40) (0.68)
59
Table 6. Gravity Regression Results-6
(4) (5) (6)
lnnetmig lnnetmig lnnetmig
rtransitexppercapto -26.0580 53.8068 62.5001
(0.14) (0.30) (0.34)
rtransitexppercapfrom 74.6250 64.9723 -13.8936
(0.65) (0.52) (0.12)
revenuefedincomeratioto -29.5959 -26.5199 -27.4769
(3.53)** (3.79)** (3.90)**
revenuefedincomeratiofrom 8.7377 4.7364 4.7703
(1.13) (0.34) (0.34)
totchargesrevpercapto -1.7999 -1.9278 -2.0174
(2.38)* (2.88)** (3.00)**
totchargesrevpercapfrom -1.6659 -1.0951 -1.4228
(1.90) (0.82) (1.03)
densityto -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0005
(0.72) (1.10) (0.95)
densityfrom -0.0001 -0.0016 -0.0024
(0.30) (1.75) (2.83)**
amenityto 0.6953 0.6819 0.6455
(5.02)** (5.43)** (5.10)**
amenityfrom 0.3769 0.3226 0.2696
(2.80)** (2.19)* (1.83)
inter11to -0.7702 2.5695 6.1896
(0.08) (0.27) (0.64)
inter11from 21.5400 -5.5066 -22.3519
(1.29) (0.26) (1.16)
inter14ato 5.2396 5.2444 5.5126
(3.33)** (3.55)** (3.69)**
inter14afrom 2.7151 8.2698 5.1173
(1.70) (2.01)* (1.27)
lncpito -4.5439 -2.8818 -3.0020
(2.94)** (2.20)* (2.31)*
lncpifrom 2.0229 0.2591 4.5048
(1.11) (0.07) (1.27)
Constant 19.7569 66.4032 27.9667
(0.98) (1.50) (0.67)
Observations 508 608 593
Adjusted R-squared 0.86 0.85 0.85
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CHAPTER IV
OPTIMUM MONETARY POLICY DURING CURRENCY UNION ENLARGEMENT
Introduction
When the theory of optimum currency areas was first introduced, it has been
considered as a detailed analysis of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. Analysis of an
appropriate currency area domain and the idea of a single monetary authority governing
the monetary policy in this currency area would be too utopic. With realization of the
European Economic and Monetary Union, as an idea in 1980s, and as reality with a single
currency and a single central bank in 1999, research in this field flourished.
Alesina and Barro (2000), and Bayoumi (1994) provide formal models that help
general equilibrium analysis within a currency union. In this paper, I make use of Bayoumi’s
(1994) set up and the general framework introduced in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ’s (1995) Redux
model.
Previous studies have emphasized heterogenity within the currency union, and
monetary policy’s and exchange rate regime’s welfare implications. Corsetti (2005) con-
siders the case of self-validating exchange rate regimes in an optimum currency area, and
concludes that diﬀerent costs of incomplete stabilization in national level among the mem-
ber countries is an eﬀect of the diﬀerence between expected national output level and its
eﬃcient level that is consistent with currency area implementations. In this paper, I at-
tribute all disturbances to monopolistic distortions, however, Corsetti (2005) stresses that
presence of incomplete stabilization leads to higher distortions than monopolistic framework
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would suggest. HughesHallet and Kavanagh (2001) show in a three country setting that
pegged exchange rate regimes with an anchor country, the size of the follower country aﬀects
the inflation in the anchor country, and the smaller the follower, the lower the inflation in
anchor country.
In this study, I focus on the question ‘What is an optimal monetary policy for
an accession country and the monetary union to follow prior to accession?’. I consider an
optimal inflation target in this model, and leave the discussion of Taylor rules to a future
research. Laxton and Pesenti (2003) show for small open economies that inflation based
rules perform better than conventional Taylor rule. Considering any potential accession
country being a small open economy, and given that the European Central Bank implements
(implicit) inflation targeting, the analysis presented in this paper, which is based on inflation
criterion, will be covering some significant grounds.
Eﬀects of country size and transmission of business cycle fluctuations via distur-
bances in terms of trade has been captured by Crucini (1997), where it has been shown that
higher volatility of business cycle in small countries follows from their interaction with big
economies. A similar interaction between economies of diﬀerent sizes can be found with the
help of nominal exchange rates. Nominal exchange rate fluctuations in a given country’s
currency versus the common currency of the union captures the terms of trade volatility
and its eﬀect on a given country’s consumption based price index that arises from economic
optimization patterns. Accession eliminates this terms of trade eﬀect between an individ-
ual country and the union. This eﬀect is captured in Alesina and Barro (2000) in form of
costs that exist due to an iceberg technology. However, this does not help us to distinguish
between advantages of establishment of currency union and customs union.
In what follows, I set up the Redux analysis with enhancing assumptions. Optimal
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monetary policy is set in form of an optimum inflation target criterion, and I analyse the
changes in optimal target criterion in case of an accession occuring.
Model
I consider two blocks of countries in a partial equilibrium model, where one is a
currency union and the other is a block of candidate countries. There are 1 countries in
the currency union and 2 countries are candidates. World consists of  countries, and
 = 1+2 In this model, each country is represented by a household, which is monopolistic
supplier of the country specific consumption good. The only input is household’s labor,
denoted by  ∈ (0 1] In the optimization problem, the representative household chooses
its nominal money holdings, bonds and labor supply.
Countries that form a currency union, namely 1 countries use a single currency
and bilateral (nominal) exchange rate between two countries is given as a ratio of the their
local currencies’ bilateral exchange rates.  denotes the bilateral exchange between country
i and the currency union, similarly  denotes the bilateral exchange rate between country
j and the currency union (i.e. price of the currency union’s currency in terms of country j’s
currency). Hence,  = 1 if both  and  are members of the currency union. Also notice
that  gives the price of country j’s currency in terms of country i’s currency. Exchange
rate regime of candidate countries is assumed to be chosen by the monetary authority of
that country exogenously.
The monetary authority uses nominal interest rates as an instrument to reach
its inflation target. The implementation of optimal policy becomes straightforward, once
it is assumed that the monetary authority can set the nominal interest rate or at least
manipulate it freely. Although this can happen only with great frictions in reality, one can
63
make such an assumption as in Woodford (2003) without loss of generality.
Representative households in diﬀerent countries have identical preferences. Al-
though this might seem to be farfetched, it is a standart assumption and will help me to
stress the eﬀects of country size.
Representative household in country i maximizes its utility
 =
∞X
=0
[log +  log
µ

¶
− ]
subject to the budget constraint:
+1 + +  = (1 + ) +−1 +
where  is the nominal wage rate in country  and at time , and
 = (
X
=1
 () −1 ) −1
is a constant elasticity of substitution consumption index, where () is the consumption
of country z’s product at time t in country j. Note that   1 gives the elasticity of
substitution between goods that are supplied by diﬀerent countries.  is the consumption
based price index for country  in which prices are denominated in country j’s currency.
Supply Side
Labor supply  and productivity shocks  determine the current level of output
which is given by  =   ∈ (0 1] or equivalently in log form  =  + 
Labor market is competitive and labor is paid its marginal product value. Hence, firms solve
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min where  =   The solution of this optimization yields the following:
 = −1 ()
where () is the price of the good that is supplied monopolistically by country  and rep-
resentative household earns its wage income by supplying its labor to this monopolistic
firm. Equivalently in log form:  +  = log+ (− 1) +  + log ()
The crucial assumption of the model is that the nominal wages are rigid down-
wards. In particular, a positive productivity shock will lead to an increase in nominal
wages, if economy is in full employment level, and a negative productivity shock reduces
labor, where nominal wage doesn’t change.
Demand
Rearranging the budget constraint:
 = (1 + ) −+1 −  +
−1
 + 
 () 

1

Demand is derived from individual ’s optimization:
{=
Ã X
=1
() 1−
! 
1−
  =
X
=1
()()
with the first order condition yielding:
(1) =
µ(2)
(1)
¶
(2)
Equating the world demand and world supply of country ’s output, we get obtain:
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 =
∙()

¸−

where  =P=1 is the world consumption.
Hence, the budget constraint becomes:
 = (1 + ) −+1 −  +
−1
 + (
 )
1
 1
(2− 1 )−
Following the procedure in appendix.1, the budget constraint boils down to:
 = (1 + ) −+1 + −1−1 + 1 − + (
 )
1
 1
(2− 1 )−
The Redux model is supported here by perfect foresight, and hence representative
household will be choosing the level of its real balance holdings accordingy
The representative household in country  solves the following problem:
{+1}[
∞X
=0
(log +  log − )]
subject to
 = (1 + ) −+1 + −1−1 + 1 − + (
 )
1
 1
(2− 1 )−
The representative household takes  as given and maximization with respect
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to +1   yields  (1 + +1) = +1  =
³
1+

´
 and finally:
 =  1
¡ ¢ 1 µ 1
¶
(2− 1 )  1   = 1 (IV.1)
where  = 
¡−  ¢   = 1− +   0
In addition to the first order conditions, transversality condition has to hold, so
that the three first order conditions given above can describe an equilibrium.
Optimal Inflation Targeting with Inertia
In this section, I discuss central bank’s loss function and combine it with the
representative household’s first order conditions.
It has been shown (Gali and Gertler, 1999) that New Keynesian Phillips Curve,
which relates cost-push elements and inflation expectations to current level of inflation, can
be expressed by  = 1˜ + 2(+1) +  where  denotes the currency union-wide
inflation, ˜ is the diﬀerence between logarithms of natural and current levels of output and
 is exogenous cost-push disturbance.
I have to mention at this point a peculiarity of inflation as discussed previously.
Inflation in the above discussion of representative household’s optimization varies across
countries only as a result of movements in the bilateral nominal exchange rates. This can
be seen by writing out the consumption based price index for country  explicitly:
 =
⎛
⎝
X
=1 6=
µ
()
¶1−⎞
⎠
1
1−
= 
⎛
⎝
X
=1 6=
µ()

¶1−⎞
⎠
1
1−
Since () is determined by world demand and world supply, inflation in a given
country, as it is measured as the change in consumption based price index  , will be aﬀected
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mainly by the bilateral exchange rate movements between country j and other countries.
There will be a common inflation rate for the whole currency union, moreover, the greater
the union, the more immune it is to nominal exchange rate fluctuations between the union
and other countries. One might object to this by viewing currency union as a fixed exchange
rate target zone and claim that the convergence and the fixed exchange rate phases come
with high adjustment costs and exchange rate risk is inevitably great.
For purposes for this current chapter, I am not looking at the phases where a
currency union is constructed. A significant amount of convergence (at least in inflation
rates and exchange rate stabilization) must have occured before a country can be considered
as a condidate for currency union admission, let alone being a member for a long time.
Imposition of the Maastricht Criteria in European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
can be considered as a case that support this view. Although alterations in the ways
mentioned above may enhance our understanding of underlying dynamics, I prefer to leave
these fruitfull issues to future research.
Woodford (2003) imposes an objective for monetary policy in Barro-Gordon fash-
ion as follows: The monetary authority aims to minimize the expected value of discounted
loss function:
{0
∞X
=0
}   = ( − −1)2 + ˜2
The loss function of the monetary authority embodies its preferences over inflation
and output, which is the solution to the loss minization problem of the monetary authority.
Recalling that the production function was given in form of  =  + , and
that full employment requires  = 1so that  = 0, and  = 0 (no productivity
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shocks), it implies that ∗ = 0    The specification of monetary objective function as
given above takes the same full employment level (namely zero) for all countries, and hence
deviation from the full employment in each period will be exactly equal to the current term’s
output. This is a result of the specifications I made in supply side (in line with Bayoumi
(1994). Woodford (2003, p.563) provides a more convinient form of target criterion for the
monetary authority by manipulating the above objective function:
( − −1) +  ( − −1) = 0   0
Inflation target criterion is useful for analyzing currency union monetary policy,
because the primary empirical interest of this model lies in the Eurozone, where the Euro-
pean Central Bank strictly implements (implicit) inflation targeting.
The presence of inflation lag is useful for justification of high inflation projection
for the current period, if inflation has been high in the previous period. I will assume that
0    1. It is important to note that  = 1 leaves no room for punishing high inflation
rates but it only counts for changes in the inflation rate. Full indexation of inertia ( = 1)
would not necessarily mean a permanent shift in inflation due to a disturbance (Woodford,
2003), but empirical testing of the hybrid version of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve gives
results diﬀerent than one for inertia coeﬃcient (Gali and Gertler, 1999).
Transforming equation (IV.1) such that log =    = 1
¡
1
 − log
¢
,
the following two equations are obtained:
 = − 1 log
 +
1
 log +
1
 log +
2

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∆ =  − −1 = ( − −1) + ( − −1)
Substituting the first order condition for  we obtain:
 = − 1 log
 +
1
 log −
1
 log  +
1
 log −
1
 log
µ
1 + 

¶
+
2

Substituting  and −1 as given above into
∆ =  − −1 = ( − −1) + ( − −1)
the following can easily be obtained:
∆ =  log
−1
 +

 log

−1 +

 log

−1 −

 log
Ã 1 + 1
1−1 + 1
!
+
µ + 2

¶
∆
where ∆ = ( − −1)
Since in this model, nominal exchange rate  gives the price of the currency
union’s currency in terms of country ’s currency,  = 1 for all values of  if country  is a
member of the currency union. We are looking here at the targeting policy of the monetary
authority of the currency union, thus log −1 = 0
Recall from the equilibrium of world demand and world supply,
 =
X
=1
 =
1X
=1
 +
X
=1+1

Since underlying preferences are identical, and since every member country has ex-
actly the same bilateral nominal exchange rate to candidate countries, the real consumption
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indeces for representative households within the currency union will necessarily be identical,
so that:
 = 1 +
X
=1+1

where  denotes that real consumption index in any of the member countries
of the currency union.
Hence, substituting all of the above manipulations into ∆, it follows:
∆ =  log

−1 −

 log
Ã 1 + 1
1
−1 + 1
!
+

 logΩ +
µ + 2

¶
∆ (IV.2)
where Ω = 1
−1+
=1+1 −1
1 +

=1+1 
Since countries within the currency union will have identical consumption pat-
terns, the monetary authority of the currency union can simply take the optimal target
criterion that would apply to any member country, if this given country had its own inde-
pendent monetary policy. The only diﬀerence between a single country’s monetary policy
and that of the currency union’s is, since the currency union is economically ‘big’, the world
consumption index  need not be taken as exogenous. As  is broken down into com-
ponents as shown above, the currency union’s size and currency union-wide consumption
actually does matter for the world consumption index.
Following the derivation of ∆ outlined above, I arrive at the following optimal
target criterion:
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 = −1−
Ã

 log

−1 −

 log
Ã 1 + 1
1
−1 + 1
!
+

 logΩ +
µ + 2

¶
∆
!
 (IV.3)
where
Ω =

1−1+
=1+1 −1


1 +
=1+1 

For notational simplicity, I denote:
Ψ =P=1+1 so that Ω = (1−1+Ψ−1)(1 +Ψ)
Moreover, with the Euler equation in first order conditions:
Ω = (1
−1+Ψ−1)
(1(1+)−1+Ψ) where  is the currency union-wide real interest rate.
This equation will be used as a rule in determining the optimal inflation target in
this chapter.
Enlargement of the Currency Union: Observations and Mechanics
As mentioned above, the currency union takes changes in  endogenous, and
change in currency union-wide consumption or enlargement will aﬀect  directly. In this
case, the monetary authority of the currency union has to set its optimal target criterion
accordingly. Analysing partial derivatives of Ω gives a better grasp of optimal monetary pol-
icy based on optimal target criterion within the currency union. Two important equations
for this matter are, as found in the previous subsection:
 = −1−
Ã

 log

−1 −

 log
Ã 1 + 1
1
−1 + 1
!
+

 logΩ +
µ + 2

¶
∆
!
 (IV.4)
with Ω = (1
−1+Ψ−1)
(1(1+)−1+Ψ)
Change in optimal target as Ω changes is given by Ω = −
¡
1Ω
¢  0 since   0
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and all other variables are positive.
Considering enlargement of currency union, one can easily see that this process
will have two facets. First, Ψ is decreasing in  , where  is the accession country to the
currency union. This country’s consumption based price index will become identical to any
of the member countries of the currency union due to adoption of the common currency,
and since preferences are identical, it will necessarily follow that the accession country’s
consumption index will become identical with  .
Since the diﬀerence in nominal exchange rates determines the diﬀerence in price
indexes and thus diﬀerence in consumption indeces, I will assume, without loss of generality
that adjustment from candidate country specific consumption index to currency union mem-
bers’ consumption index happens immediately upon accession. (In what follows, variables
without country specific indeces are currency union-wide variables).
One clarification I need to mention is, when I worked the following out for currency
union members, I set log = 0 so that the nominal exchange rate did not show up in
the rest of the expression for an optimum target criterion.
 = − 1 log
 +
1
 log +
1
 log +
2

However, as I discuss the case of an accession country, one has to consider whether
log  0 or log  0 prior to accession. Suppose that the accession country is at full
employment with no productivity shock. Then,
log =
µ
−+ 1 log
 − log − 2
¶
→ log   log = 0
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If log  0 then  declines and converges to   whereas if log  0 then
 increases and converges to  .
There are many crutial matters which are left out of this model, moreover, some
implications which could have been captured within the frames of this model might have
been washed out by simplifying assumptions such as the one above. However the current
framework that I use here shows that the more depreciated a country’s currency is against
the common currency of the union, the higher are the benefits of joining the union for this
country. One possible objection could be that diﬀerences in nominal exchange rates are pure
nominal matters. In this model, however, nominal exchange rates aﬀect country specific
consumption based price indeces and thus they aﬀect consumption decisions. Nominal
exchange rates in this model can be thought of embodiment of any transactions costs and
rigidities that arise due to fluctuations in nominal exchange rates.
Incentives for a country to join a currency union has long been investigated, but
my question is, how does log  0 or log  0 aﬀect the optimal target criterion of the
currency union?
Suppose that the accession occurs in period  . Comparing Ω under accession
(Ω ) to its "would-be" value Ω if no accession occured ( follows from Euler equaion
and serves as projection of country 0 consumption index if no accession occured):
Ω −Ω =
¡1−1 +Ψ−1¢¡
(1 + 1) + (Ψ − )
¢ − ¡1−1 +Ψ−1¢¡1 +Ψ¢ (IV.5)
Hence,
Ω −Ω  0 
¡ − ¢  0  log  0 (IV.6)
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Ω −Ω  0 
¡ − ¢  0  log  0 (IV.7)
Recall that Ω  0 hence accession of a country with appreciated national cur-
rency versus the common currency of the union (log  0), would increase the optimal
target criterion for the currency union’s monetary policy. Accession of a depreciated cur-
rency country will, on the other hand, decrease the optimal target criterion.
Optimal Target Under Monetary Shocks and Productivity Shocks
Above, I have shown that an optimal target criteria is:
 = −1 − 
Ã

 log

−1 −

 log
Ã 1
 + 1
1−1 + 1
!
+

 logΩ +
µ + 2

¶
∆
!
As far as this criterion is concerned, an unanticipated expansionary monetary
shock in current period necessitates an upwards revision of the inflation target and a con-
tractionary monetary policy allows for lower target values, which is not very surprising.
Interaction of monetary shocks with productivity shocks works in opposite directions as
long as +2  0 If, on the other hand, +2  0, then monetary shock needs to be in the
same direction as the productivity shock to cancel out its eﬀect on optimal inflation target.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
Interactions between the capital tax rate and the inflation rate have been investi-
gated under two possible scenarios: First, when countries have their own currencies, namely
‘monetary independence’, and second, when countries form a currency union and introduce
a common currency for the union.
Capital tax rates and inflation rates interact in three diﬀerent ways: The capital
tax rate set by the national government of a country creates a horizontal externality for
the other country’s national government, and this eﬀect pushes the equilibrium level of
capital tax rates in both countries down. A similar eﬀect is present for the choice of the
inflation rate associated with the domestic currency. Inflation tax competition pushes the
equilibrium level of inflation rates in both countries down. However, there is a vertical
externality created by the interaction of capital taxes and inflation, which may lead to
higher capital tax rates in both countries.
If the two countries form a currency union, then inflation rate that prevails across
the currency union will be higher than the inflation that would prevail in individual countries
under monetary independence. Although inflation rate will be higher, individual countries
may choose a lower or a higher capital tax rate than what they would choose under monetary
independence. The decision of whether the optimal capital tax rate in a given country will
increase or decrease due to creation of a currency union depends on the inflation elasticities
of the demand for each country’s national curren
The ‘same sign problem’ arises when using the 2000 Census migration data, as it
has when using earlier Census migration data. Our main contribution is to demonstrate
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that the same sign problem tends to diminish when migrations over very short distances are
excluded from the regressions, or when only outmigration from higher per-capita income
states is considered. These two methods apparently provide some correction for the hetero-
geneity of elderly migrants. Once corrected, the relative attractiveness of a state’s bundle
of public goods and taxes becomes more apparent.
Previous studies have shown that prices of location specific amenities are to some
extent implicit in labor market and/or land market prices. A state or local government’s
tendency to additionally impose higher taxes on residents to capture those residents’ will-
ingness to pay for amenities will inevitably lead to a sort of ‘double taxation’ of the tax
base, as is noted in ‘vertical tax competition’ studies. The investigation of the eﬀects of
such a ‘double taxation’ is necessarily our next stop.
Accession of a country with an appreciating currency would force the optimum
inflation target of the currency union upwards, whereas a country with a depreciating
currency will cause a downward push. Analyzing the comovement of productivity shocks
and aggregation of currency union-wide productivity shocks are problems that need to be
worked on more carefully.
Intiutively, accession of a country with appreciating currency might cause an up-
ward price adjustment in other member states. This also depends on the size of the accession
country, however in this model, all countries are of equal size, only size of the currency union
diﬀers from that of the accession country since the union necessarily includes more than
one country. Size of the currency union will come into play upon relaxation of the simplify-
ing assumption that the accession country is in full employment level with no productivity
shock during accession..
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